Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-215
Tuesday
7 November 1995

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FBIS-EEU-95-215 *7 November 1995*

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Commentary on Seselj's Plan To 'Empty' Kosovo

AU0311164795 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 1 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by Rrustem Rugova: "Opposition at a Serious Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The diplomatic language that Albanians use at home is one thing, while that used with the international community is another. Meanwhile, Serbian political programs for the physical extermination of the Albanians and what is mildly termed changing the ethnic composition of Kosova are matters that must be taken much more seriously. Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party has just published its program for "solving the question of Kosovo and Metohija." This program indeed includes nothing new that the Albanians have not felt on their own backs these past 80 years. The Seseljites' demands for the creation of Serbian enclaves in Kosova, especially in a strip along the border with Albania, for the expulsion of 400,000 Albanians who have supposedly come as immigrants to Kosova from Albania, for the easier transportation of Albanians abroad and the erection of obstacles to their return, for their dismissal from work and hindrances to their work in the private sector, for the isolation and compromising of prominent Albanian personalities, and for the encouragement of criminality among the Albanians, and the cultivation of drugs and terrorism in order to erode the Albanians' traditional morals, have all been aims of the Serbian state since it arrived in these territories after the Balkan War of 1912, alongside the murders and massacres of the innocent population that the Albanians have suffered.

One new suggestion that the Seseljites offer to Serbian state policy to "solve the question of Kosovo and Metohija" is the idea that Albanians should be helped to go abroad in an organized fashion, and that the development of private Albanian schools "in a parallel education system" should be stimulated and encouraged.

Concessions in Granting Passports

It is probable that the Seseljites, as is their way, have by publishing this program merely exposed something that the Serbian state apparatus in Kosova has already been "silently" carrying out, especially since the beginning of the 1990's. After the textbook invasion of Kosova and the establishment of the Serbian military and police apparatus, Serbia's first aim was indeed to empty Kosova. At that time, young Albanian men received call-up papers for the Army, and their parents were subsequently dismissed from their jobs and from the political and administrative system. The doors for their expulsion were opened in the direction of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and beyond, to Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and the countries of Europe, while this matter was concealed from the eyes of the world and the public at home. Hundreds and thousands of young Albanian men took that dismal road to the "promised land" of free Europe before a razor had even touched their faces. The Serbian officials installed in Kosova boasted to Serbian Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic that 500,000 passports had been issued to Albanians during 1992. In order to keep the game going, the Serbian regime began to make it slightly more difficult to obtain these international documents, but encouraged bribery and the use of middlemen.

Other channels were then opened to send the Albanians abroad, first via the Montenegrin coast and now via Subotica. The Seseljites' option is to make it easier for Albanians to go abroad and to hinder their return. Before the Seseljites issued their program, the current Serbian regime was already doing this, for it is no secret that the Albanians have no difficulty leaving Kosova, but their return is made problematic and requires evidence of when they went abroad and of enforced payments. This is just what Seselj wants when he advocates "hindering the return of the 400,000 Albanians who have gone abroad since 1990."

Seselj prefers private education as a way of isolating the Albanians and ensuring their intellectual backwardness. However, his options are precisely those that Serbian institution have so far used.

Encouraging Criminality and Compromising Albanians

The Seseljites advocate what the current Serbian regime has in fact already carried out in practice: the compromising of prominent Albanian personalities and their isolation from the public, and the encouragement of crime in all its forms, but especially those kinds that are subject to international regulation. Crime in Kosova, from bribery to theft, monstrous secret killings, the spread of drugs and prostitution, and the creation of various scandals with the aim of politically dividing the Albanians, has become widespread and is on the increase.

These facts are no secret from the public, nor are the preferred methods to encourage criminality in business. However, the Albanian political institutions and the Albanians who are organized in the struggle for Kosova's independence have merely observed and recorded these overt and covert trends, without taking any specific measures to stop them. It is not enough merely to identify the institutions, which are unfortunately headed by some Albanians, that are contributing to the Serbian plan to

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empty Kosova, just as protests by the occasional political party against these phenomena are also not enough. The response must be general and public. It is also inexcusable that political quarrels and divisions among the Albanians themselves, which are often started for careerist purposes in an attempt "to remain on the Albanian political stage at all costs" should fail to be condemned as attempts by the Serbian regime itself to weaken the Albanians' internal unity on the threshold of the world conferences to solve the crises of the former Yugoslavia and the questions of Bosnia and Kosova in particular.

Internal organization will be the decisive factor in practically realizing Kosova's independence.

Perpetrators of 1990-92 'Killings' To Be Tried

AU0711114895 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 1 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by E. Barci: "Border Killers on Trial"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The legislature's Commission of Public Order and SHIK [National Intelligence Service] will be the plaintiff against all those who organized and perpetrated killings along the border," stated Commission chairman Azem Hajdari, yesterday. The official killers from the period July 1990-March 1992, will soon be up for investigation. From Ramiz Alia to the ordinary soldier, all will have to answer for the killings along the border after July 90 and for the killings in towns during the fall of communism until March 92. "Until now there has been no opposition from the opposition members of the commission," declares Hajdari, adding that "the lawsuit accuses all those who chose killing as a means of prolonging their power." A member of the Commission of Public Order and SHIK is also the Socialist Party [PS] Secretary General Ruci who was minister of interior in 1991. According to commission inner sources he has not opposed the decision. Hajdari gives an individual response to Ruci: "When asked in Erseke about killings along the border, Ruci said that the democratic state has to be asked about it. The state is doing its job." Clarifying the legal basis of the lawsuit, Hajdari says: "Even when border crossing was no longer considered as treachery to the homeland, but penal guilt, the border guards killed many people." People were killed along the entire border line. In 1990, defection was the only way to escape from the dictatorship and extreme poverty. "They were the most inhuman killings in the history of mankind. To terrorize the population, many of the killed were dragged through the streets of towns and villages," says Hajdari. The Ministry of Interior and especially the police commissariats in the border regions are working to prepare the lawsuit. The commissariats are preparing the individual files of those killed during the 1990-92 period. The files will contain the time and the place of the crime and the actual people who perpetrated it. "From those who drew up the order, to those who received it, and those who gave the order up to the killers," says Hajdari of those who will be included in the lawsuit. According to the above, the former president Ramiz Alia may once again be tried. It is a fact that it was Azem Hajdari and Arben Imami [Democratic Alliance deputy] who insisted on Alia's arrest in 1992. "The Ministry of Interior, contrary to the laws of the time, undertook another role directed by the Political Bureau and Ramiz Alia—the role of killer and terrorizer of the Albanian citizens in order to prolong the life of communism," says Hajdari. "Alia was not only the initiator of these killings, but also the person who was individually informed of those killed," he continues. One of the commission's tasks is also to decode the communication between branches and the Ministry of Interior or the party. According to Hajdari, this is done so that "only the actual people who have a connection with the killings will be condemned."

Alia, Isai 'Risk Prison Again'

AU0511175495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian on 4 November carries on page 3, under the general headline "Alia and Isai in Prison Again?," a 400-word report by P. Re. under the subheadline "Denunciations by 14 Families Ready," and a 500-word interview by Ilir Alia with Democratic Party Deputy Marash Ibraj in Tirana, date not given, under the subheadline "Fushe Arrez Massacre: Charges Over 40 Deaths?"

P. Re.'s report states, "'Ramiz Alia and Hekuran Isai risk prison again.' The charges relate to a special period of the dictatorship. In 1990, the last year of the regime, a change to the Penal Code meant that illegal crossings of the border were no longer deemed 'treason to the homeland.' This led a large number of mainly young people to attempt to cross the barbed wire that then separated Albania from the rest of the world. Many of them were lucky, but others were killed by the bullets of the border guards who 'stood watch day and night guarding the socialist homeland.' The families of the dead, and not they alone, are now calling these murders unjustified by the laws of the time. For some, there is no longer a shadow of doubt that those who ordered these murders must be held accountable by law, because they broke even the laws of that period. It is said that 14 families are collecting evidence to learn who really ordered these killings, but that they are utterly convinced of the guilt of Alia and Isai.

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"This opens up again one of the most acute problems inherited from the past. The story of the murders of 1990 is not entirely unknown. The press, television, and the families themselves have denounced these violations of the law. Everyone was struck at the famous trial of the blockmen [inhabitants of residential block of former communist leaders] by the figure of a woman dressed in black, who, whenever she spoke, protested against the regime's three foremost leaders, 'They are guilty, and must answer for other things.' The woman from Korce had several times shown macabre photographs of her son, killed by the border guards' bullets at precisely this time. Who then ordered these killings in contravention of the law? Investigations, which will apparently begin immediately after the denunciations, will explain this."

The report is accompanied by a list of 29 names of "border victims, 1989-90."

Ilir Alia's interview begins with his words: "Another case on the prosecutor's desk—but this time the painful incident does not belong to the distant past. It concerns the killing in the town of Fushe Arrez at the end of 1991 of more than 40 people, who were 'buried' when a food depot collapsed. The charges will be laid by the families of the victims and by the deputy Marash Ibraj, initiator of the investigations. It is expected that not only the then local managers and warehousemen will appear in the dock, but also those who intentionally failed to throw light on the truth.

"Why has the present moment been chosen to go back to the events of December [1991] in Fushe Arrez?

"[Ibraj] I support this initiative, although it is not one of the commission. I also issue an appeal, as deputy for the Fushe Arrez constituency, addressed to the families of the victims of this tragic incident, to join me, on the basis of the adequate legal grounds. This will enable us to bring to justice the culprits of this unprecedented crime.

"[Alia] What have you done as deputy of this constituency to throw light at least to some extent on the events?

"[Ibraj] When my insistent approaches to the responsible authorities failed to produce any response, I walked out of parliament two years ago in protest. After this, a temporary parliamentary commission to investigate the issue was created with the support of President Sali Berisha. This commission has come out in total support of my claims regarding the incident, and on the basis of the facts, provided a great deal of work for the prosecutor, one of whose tasks was to report back regularly to the commission. Unfortunately, down to the present day neither I as the deputy initiating the investigations nor the commission have received a single report on the progress of the case. As a citizen of Fushe Arrez and the deputy of the constituency, I will be among those who will soon sign the denunciation of the culprits of the crime and those who deliberately failed to uncover the truth.

"[Alia] What specifically will you do?

"[Ibraj] First, I must say that together with the families of the victims we will soon submit a suit to the prosecutor over the events in Fushe Arrez in December 1991. One cannot remain indifferent to the intentional killing of more than 40 people, especially when the culprits of this crime, one of the last crimes of the dictatorship, continue to roam free and undisturbed. Second, it must be said that some members of the government, judges, prosecutors, and investigators had every opportunity to expose the authors of the crime. If they were unable to do this, they should have been employed in other capacities. If they did not wish to uncover the truth, they must be accountable before the law."

Arbnori Proposes Constitutional Commission

AU0211213895 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 2 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Ilir Alia: "Pjeter Arbnori Proposes 'Commission for Constitution'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The problem of the constitution has reappeared on the scene. This time it is People's Assembly Chairman Pjeter Arbnori himself who has raised it. Arbnori, after consultations with the two chairmen of the parliamentary groups, announced his five-point proposals at the end of the parliamentary session. Arbnori's first proposal is to create an entirely new commission that will prepare a new draft of the country's basic law. In his second proposal, he spoke on behalf of the party he represents. "The Democratic Party," he said, "although it possesses a majority in parliament, asks for only 40 to 45 percent of the membership of this commission." In his third point, Arbnori called for support for the idea launched by President Berisha, that one of the 15 countries of the EU should be taken as a model, though not copied. The leading parliament member's idea of how the commission should approve its decisions is either by consensus or by a two-thirds majority. To make the draft as good as possible, Arbnori in his final point proposed inviting foreign specialists to help at least to some extent.

The problem of approving the constitution has been absent from Albanian politics for about one year. It was

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on 6 November last year that the draft put forward by the government was rejected by the referendum. The failed draft was strongly opposed by opposition forces, which considered it to be the kind of constitution that would serve the interests of a single party. Arbnori's proposal yesterday for a new commission to approve the constitution did not provoke any response from the opposition parties.

Party Leaders View Proposal

AU0411141695 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 3 Nov 95 p 3

[Unattributed interviews with Prec Zogaj, spokesman of the Democratic Alliance; Skender Gjinushi, chairman of the Social Democratic Party; Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party; and Luan Hajdaraga, deputy chairman of the Socialist Party; place and date not given: "The Constitution: Through Parliament or by Referendum?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Through parliament or by a referendum? Controversy has again been kindled over the constitution. "We want to know how it will be approved." This debate between the opposition and the ruling party has long included this "refrain," ever since the rejection of the draft constitution on 6 November last year. The reason for this controversy lies in Pjeter Arbnori's proposal to create a parliamentary commission that will draw up a new draft.

Prec Zogaj, Democratic Alliance

[Zogaj] This is a proposal that reflects the verdict of the Albanian people expressed one year ago in the referendum on the constitution, and also the opposition's demand for a new parliamentary commission. This might mean a start to unblocking the constitution and must necessarily lead to a definition of the legal procedure for approving the constitution. The Democratic Alliance takes this opportunity to repeat yet again that the Constitution, as the Bible of a democratic and law-governed state, demands cooperation among all the political parties and a readiness for consensus. One might comment in many ways on the moment that has been chosen. We say better late than never; producing the constitution is a task of importance that transcends every calculation on gaining political points. Let us be realistic: There is no way that one can imagine the constitution being approved today without the involvement of the Democratic Party [PD]. This most recent proposal is a belated but positive step.

Skender Gjinushi, Social Democratic Party [PSD]

[Gjinushi] This is an old proposal to start a new political game in order to allow the defeat of last November to fade away. I say this because Arbnori's renewed proposal to form a commission would be the most normal way to draw up a draft constitution, and it is absurd to imagine that there has supposedly been a debate for the past year about creating such a commission, when we know that the failure could not and cannot be ascribed to the commission. The failure lies in a lack of respect for the Constitutional Law and the consensus among the parties. Everybody knows that the PD and the president broke this law and organized a referendum in order to avoid parliament—in other words, to avoid the explicit will of the other parties and even of the PD's own parliamentary group. If this commission does not work for parliament, but for somebody else, we announce our firm stand against taking part. However, we, as the PSD, have another condition: revoking Article 3 of the Genocide Law. We will then believe that the PD is in favor of a democratic constitution.

Sabri Godo, Republican Party

[Godo] Arbnori's proposal may have been made for political purposes before the election campaign in order to show the PD's good intentions toward solving this knotty problem of Albanian politics. The important thing is to define the procedure whereby the constitution will be approved. I think that all this will end up as a political game. The first signs of this game have come from the Socialist Party [PS] and the three other parties that immediately issued a proposal that a draft they themselves had drawn up should be taken into consideration. If every party is going to prepare its own constitution, no constitution will ever be produced. This is in the meantime a serious issue that concerns the whole people. The Republican Party will take part in this commission if it is invited. We favor the constitution being approved by parliament. If it is not passed, it should then go to a referendum.

Luan Hajdaraga, PS

[Hajdaraga] I hope that Arbnori's proposal is not another political maneuver on the part of the PD. The PS has been and remains in favor of the constitution, but has always emphasized that it is parliament that must approve it. It seems to me peculiar to talk so much about creating a parliamentary commission to prepare a draft text. Arbnori's proposal is entirely normal, and does not differ in substance from the PD's earlier proposals on this problem. The essential thing is to inform parliament of the manner in which the draft is to be approved, about which the Constitutional Law is quite explicit.

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Blaga Dimitrova Calls Videnov 'Fascist Gauleiter'

AU0611154095 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 3 Nov 95 p 1

[Election appeal by Blaga Dimitrova, poet and former vice president, and her husband Yordan Vasilev, chairman of Federation of Democracy Clubs: "Zhan Is a Fascist Gauleiter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime minister has called our country's capital a "blue ghetto."

Bulgaria did not permit a Jewish ghetto even when Hitler's jackboots were on the march. At that time, our country opposed racism, intolerance, and hatred of those who were different.

Now the head of the Bulgarian Government is casting his racist scorn at the citizens of Sofia, merely because they think differently from him. Yet this outcast represents us in the world! How are diplomats going to receive him?

Where should the capital be moved? To our country's second city? However, Plovdiv is even more consciously democratic! What about Varna, the third city? It, too, does not suit the man who wants to call the tune.

In our eyes, Zhan Videnov is a fascist gauleiter and a racist in relation to his very own people. It is an insult to our fatherland for him to lead the government.

Citizens who share our views can give us their names by telephoning the number 88-25-01, extension 24.

Opposition Parties Pool Votes for 2d Round

AU0611200695 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 2 Nov 95 p 1

[FBIS Translated Text]

Appeal

Accepting that the unity of the opposition is the most important condition for success in the second round of the elections and that no alternative exists, the leaderships of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], the People's Union of the Democratic Party and BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], and the Rights and Freedoms Movement address the following appeal to their own candidates and the candidates supported by them who are running for the posts of mayors of municipalities, districts, and populated settlements:

1. To withdraw their candidatures in favor of the candidate who received most votes in the first round of the local elections.

2. To offer public support to the opposition's single candidate in his election campaign for the second decisive ballot.

We call upon all extraparliamentary opposition parties and coalitions to join in publicly supporting the candidate of the united opposition.

We call upon all our electors to vote in support of the united opposition's candidate, joining together to halt the Bulgarian Socialist Party's assault on local government.

For the SDS: Ivan Kostov

For the People's Union: Anastasiya Mozer for the BZNS and Stefan Savov for the Democratic Party

For the Rights and Freedoms Movement: Ahmed Dogan

1 November 1995

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Last Tank Dismantled Under CFE Treaty

LD0611145095 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The last tank to be liquidated under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] was dismantled in the military repair works in Novy Jicin [northern Moravia] today. [passage omitted]

According to Defense Minister Vilem Holan, our Army's equipment has already changed and has become one to serve defense. According to Vladimir Suman, chairman of the parliamentary Defense and Security Council, this act is yet another proof of the credibility of the Czech Republic in implementing treaties.

Havel Meets Army Commanders, Assesses Changes

LD0711110295 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] An annual meeting of Czech Army commanders, attended by President Vaclav Havel, started at the Defense Ministry in Prague today. Pavel Riacek reports:

[Riacek] Opening the session, Havel said that the first and main phase of the Czech Army's transformation had been concluded. The Army was transformed into the modern army of a democratic state, following its split carried out in an almost invisible and painless way. All of the changes made in its structure are important, and the Army deserves our thanks. At the same time, our public begins to trust the Army, though only slowly. This is reflected by, among other things, people's growing attendance at military oaths and other military events. It seems that the Czech Army is also gaining quite a good name in the world. It is perceived as consolidated and good and is praised during joint exercises.

Our share in guaranteeing the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina will represent, to a certain extent, a test of how serious we are about our NATO membership and how willing we are to share responsibility for international security, said Havel. [passage omitted]

Klaus on Possible Abolishment of Some Ministries

LD0711121095 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Several functions at present carried out by the Czech Culture Ministry could be transferred to other ministries, and other ministries could also be abolished, said Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in his regular interview on Czech Radio.

[Begin Klaus recording] I am convinced that, after the [1996 parliamentary] elections, we can reduce the number of ministries as a part of overall savings in state administration. I think it is fair to consider the Culture Ministry to be one of the candidates.

Clearly, we have too many economic ministries. Our privatization process is approaching its conclusion. Besides the Privatization Ministry, we have the Economy Ministry, the Industry and Trade Ministry, and the Ministry for Economic Competition. My view is that, in the worse scenario, three ministries of these four would be preserved, while, in the better scenrario, only two of them would be preserved. [end recording]

Dlouhy Leaves Hospital To Recuperate at Home

AU0711134195 Prague PRAVO in Czech 3 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by "(zaj)": "Dlouhy Will Nip Along to the Government From Home"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Vladimir Dlouhy, the trade and industry minister and Civic Democratic Alliance deputy chairman, was released from the Bulovka Faculty Hospital on 2 November. He will be cared for at home. He should put in an appearance at the ministry in about three weeks. Until then, he will be working from home by telephone, he hold PRAVO. He said that this was what he had been doing during his stay in the hospital.

In about two weeks from now, the minister will be allowed to go out, when, he said, he will nip along to a government session or a meeting of the economy ministers. He will still be on a strict diet, which lasts for six months in the case of jaundice-related illnesses.

The minister was in the hospital for about two weeks because of viral hepatitis A, with slight symptoms of jaundice.

According to Vilma Maresova, the head of the infectious diseases unit at the Bulovka Faculty Hospital, "If everything is fine, the minister may go to work before the end of November; otherwise it might easily not be until the end of the year." She has told CTK that Dlouhy will have to have regular medical checkups for at least a year.

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Minister Schenk Criticized for Not Meeting Kovac

AU0611201195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 2 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by "r": "Minister Schenk Has Not Met With the President Also Because He Has Been Sending His State Secretary To Meet and Accompany the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—We asked Pavol Demes, director of the Foreign Policy Department at the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic and former Slovak minister of international relations, for his reaction to Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk's claim that, in his 11 months in office, President Kovac did not consult him even once:

It is sad when the chief of diplomacy, until recently a university professor, resorts to untrue statements about the head of state. At his news conference on 30 October, he said, among other things:

"...in my 11 months in office, the president of the Republic did not ask me, as minister, for a meeting and consultations in the sphere of foreign policy even once." On 18 January 1995, Minister Schenk met with the president and other high constitutional officials to discuss the coordination of foreign policy. They agreed to hold further meetings, which have not been realized, however, through no fault of the president. After the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty, the minister received a letter from the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic with a request for information and consultations. The meeting with the president and the directors of presidential office departments in Primatial Palace on 27 March 1995, like other events, was attended by State Secretary Jozef Sestak. Gradually, the minister ceased to attend even events where protocol required his presence, such as the presentation of credentials by ambassadors accredited to the Slovak Republic, and farewell and welcoming ceremonies during the president's trips abroad. Even during his recent visit to the United States, the president of the Republic was accompanied by State Secretary Jozef Sestak. Finally, receptions held on the occasion of embassy openings or national days can also be used to exchange views. Minister Schenk has gradually ceased to attend even such receptions, to the astonishment of even ambassadors.

If the minister of foreign affairs claims that he misses meetings with the president and that such meetings could forestall complications—it is never too late. Today, in particular. The question also remains open of why, in his 11 months in office, Minister Schenk did not ask for a meeting with the Republic's number one diplomat—the president of the Republic.

Mr. Schenk will surely discuss these and other problems of our foreign policy openly and truthfully at the upcoming meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. At this hour, this is critical for the international position of Slovakia. From my position, I can assure Minister Schenk that cooperation between the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic at lower levels is truly continuous and correct.

[Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 3 November on page 3 carries a 700-word Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement in response to Pavol Demes's statement in the 2 November issue of Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak. The statement reiterates Juraj Schenk's assertion that, in the foreign minister's 11 months in office, the president did not once ask him for consultations or a meeting, adding that the "short meeting on 18 January" only concerned an "exchange of working invitations and reception proposals." The statement goes on to assert that, whenever he can, Minister Schenk fulfills his duties under the protocol and, when he is unable to attend, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "secures appropriate representation." This reportedly also concerns the participation of State Secretary Sestak in the president's trips abroad where "the post of state secretary is equal to that of minister." The Ministry's statement then challenges Pavol Demes's view that embassy receptions are an appropriate occasion for the exchange of views between the head of state and ministers and expresses surprise at the fact that Demes does not know that a minister cannot ask the head of state for a meeting. Summing up, the statement says that "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic is forced to note that, with his distorted assertions, Mr. Demes incorrectly informs the public and intentionally spreads disinformation."]

SME Reporter Probing Kovac Kidnapping Assaulted

AU0711105595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 2 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by "r": "Editor of Daily SME Who Is Devoting Himself to the Kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr. Was Assaulted Tuesday Night"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—An editor of the daily SME who is devoting himself to the case of Michal Kovac Jr. was assaulted by an unknown perpetrator on the night of 31 October. The incident was preceded by a telephone call from an unidentified man who asked our editor for a meeting. The caller failed to turn up, however, and, as the SME editor was returning home, he was assaulted at the corner of the street where he

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lives. The perpetrator attacked him from the dark and the editor was therefore unable to see his face. During the assault, the assailant did not say a single word and did not steal anything. Before our editor managed to get up, the assailant was gone. On the day of the assault, the SME editor noticed in his apartment that someone who does not live there opened the kitchen window. He was unable to determine whether the window had been opened from the inside or the outside. The editor also noticed that, for more than two weeks, unknown people have been monitoring his movements and people contacted by him. It is not out of the question that, on the day of the physical assault, he had been followed to the corner of the street where he lives and that someone had signaled to the assailant that he was approaching. Some three weeks before this incident, an unknown caller from Trnava threatened our editor with the words: "I do not want to intimidate you but I am capable of a great deal." After the incident, the SME editor gave testimony at the local police station and filed criminal charges against an unknown perpetrator. The same night he also underwent a medical examination.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 2 November on page 1 carries a 300-word report by "sdl" on the incident, which specifies that the victim of the attack was SME editor Peter Toth. The report includes the following passage: "'It was apparently the work of a professional,' Peter Toth claims. He believes that the incident is related to his articles on the background of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction. Strange things started happening right after his commentary on the Slovak Information Service that was published in late June. At that time he found at home on the carpet, the muddy footprints of a shoe unlike those used by residents of the apartment. During the past three weeks, he found out that someone is again secretly visiting his apartment, is shadowing him, and collecting information on his whereabouts and on the people he meets."]

Opposition Concerned About Meciar Talks in Russia

AU0711114995 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Nov 95 p 8

[Article by Karol Wolf: "The Slovak Opposition Wants a Discussion on the Relationship With Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to Slovak opposition leaders, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar should tell the people what his plans are regarding the relationship between Russia and Slovakia. Meciar is currently on a tour of the post-Soviet republics and, the day before yesterday, he held almost two hours of private talks with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in Moscow. No information from these talks has been made public.

"The prime minister has several times held many hours of talks with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and then refused to say what he discussed. Apart from this, it is common knowledge that they have met literally secretly on several occasions," said Democratic Union Deputy Chairman Jan Budaj yesterday.

According to the Democratic Union, under Meciar's leadership, Slovakia is coming ever closer to the stage where it will again find itself in Russia's sphere of economic and political influence.

In this connection, Budaj thinks that Meciar is keeping his talks with Russian representatives secret because he is concerned about the reaction of the public, which, according to Budaj, does not feel any confidence in Russia.

"The prime minister feels at home among Russian politicians. This is the only place where he does not need an interpreter and his ideas about the style of political work are very close to those of the Russians," continued Jan Budaj.

Besides this, opposition leaders point out that more and more reports are emerging from Western diplomatic missions in Bratislava according to which the West is slowly but surely coming to the conclusion that Slovakia is no longer interested in integrating into Western security and economic groupings and is banking on the resumption of closer ties with Russia.

In this context, observers are pointing out that the Slovak prime minister, at a news conference in Moscow, did not react in any way to Chernomyrdin's attack on the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance by the countries of Central Europe.

"We are creating the conditions for entry into NATO, but the situation may develop differently and a Pan-European security system with the participation of Russia may also evolve," said Meciar in Moscow. He added that the Alliance should transform itself into a Pan-European organization and should not contribute to the redivision of Europe into East and West.

In the opinion of European security policy experts, the Slovak prime minister, by making this statement, has definitively shut the door on admission into NATO and has made it clear that he views the entire issue the same way as Russian politicians.

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Commentary Says Country 'Trojan Horse' for Moscow

AU0711111095 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Nov 95 p 12

[Commentary by Karol Wolf: "Is Slovakia Moscow's Trojan Horse?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A great deal has already been written about Vladimir Meciar's visits to Russia and about his innumerable "secret" or "in camera" meetings with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

If we disregard the extraordinarily friendly relations between these two politicians, manifested, among other things, by their common fondness for holding private talks and then not saying anything, the fact is that Meciar always returns from Russia with a stack of signed agreements and with visibly reinforced political self-confidence. When he comes back, it is as if the Slovak prime minister, who obviously feels at home in Russia, is again inspired with the knowledge that what he is doing is correct.

A pack of "snapping" newshounds always awaits him at home and, as a rule, Meciar immediately gets worked up because they ask him what he was doing in Russia, with whom he was holding talks, what he signed, what he promised, and what was promised to him. He never replies to everything and then there is almost always an addendum where he attacks the press and declares that no one understands how important and advantageous it is for Slovakia to have close trading and, therefore, political contacts with Russia.

And, this is where the problem begins. At the moment, it is not clear whether this is just ignorance or a real determination to push Slovakia back into the sphere of Russia's influence, but it is obvious that the Russian market is not yet a standard market with everything that pertains to it, while this conclusion concerns precisely the countries of the former Soviet bloc. In other words, the Russian market is undoubtedly interesting and has good prospects. But, every country in the security vacuum of Central Europe has to take into consideration that no agreement with Russia is free. The old Russian imperial doctrine that automatically links economic agreements with political supplements simply still exists. And it is manifesting itself now when a new division into spheres of influence is taking place.

It is possible to state this even more clearly. Can Slovakia or a comparable central European country offer Russia anything that a Western state could not offer? It would probably be difficult. That is, if Russia decides to accept something from such a country, it is clear that it has its own special reasons for doing so.

In the brief history of modern Russo-Slovak relations, it is impossible to overlook certain facts: cooperation in arms development, a total lack of effort on Slovakia's part to look for sources of raw materials outside Russia, and, finally, the Slovak Government's literally servile reaction to Russia's attacks on NATO enlargement.

Meciar is the only prime minister of a central European country who, when he is standing next to his Russian colleague, cannot say clearly that Slovakia's admission into NATO is a Slovak affair and that it has nothing to do with Russia.

It is obvious that there are "goods" that only the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can offer Russia and that, according to recent developments, Bratislava is offering. Of course, it is thus placing itself in the role of the ancient Trojan horse, through which Russia will try to torpedo the process of the enlargement of the West's sphere of influence.

Russian Official Outlines Agreement on Mochovce

AU0611220295 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 2 Nov 95 pp 1, 13

[Interview with Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy, by Ivan Drabek and Felix Alexeyev in Moscow on 31 October: "Slavic Variant of Completing Mochovce"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [PRAVDA] The Slovak-Russian intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in completing the first two units of the Mochovce nuclear power plant, signed on Tuesday, 31 October, is a precedent in that, for the first time ever, Moscow has undertaken to extend a loan to a European country outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). But will the amount of $150 million that Moscow will provide be sufficient?

[Mikhaylov] That $150 million is just the beginning. This loan will be sufficient for putting the first 440-megawatt unit into operation. The completion of both units will require about $400 million. Under this so-called Slavic variant, in which Russia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic will participate, we will be able to complete both units in two or three years.

[PRAVDA] Does the "Slavic variant" mean that Mochovce will be completed without Western participation?

[Mikhaylov] When you went to the West and asked the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] for a loan, how did it turn out? You were given a drastic condition—to close the nuclear power plant at Jaslovske Bohunice. The EBRD used the same approach

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toward us when it came up with the demand that we stop the operation of the entire first generation of our nuclear power generating units. We advanced to the EBRD experts the offer to participate in experts' analysis, and the bank accepted it. However, the opening and closure of nuclear power plants cannot be the EBRD's business. The bank is far too politicized, and too many different interests clash there, for it to fulfill such a mission.

[PRAVDA] Are you not expecting too much of Czech financial institutions when you expect them to provide nearly $250 million for the project? Is there still any chance for Germany to become involved in the project?

[Mikhaylov] Banks live from lending money for promising projects. This is undoubtedly the case of Czech banks as well. I therefore think that, by the time the first unit is on stream, money will also be found for the second unit. As for potential German participation, I would welcome it. I have had good experiences with Siemens.

[PRAVDA] What will be the specific use of the $80-million loan from the Russian Ministry of Finance and the $70-million loan from Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy)?

[Mikhaylov] A larger part of the loan will cover previously supplied equipment purchased, for the most part, in the West, for example from Siemens. The rest will be used for equipment manufactured in Russia. The Minatom will provide a loan for fuel.

[PRAVDA] Have you already agreed on the amount?

[Mikhaylov] The contract is to be concluded by 10 November. There should not be any problem.

[PRAVDA] When the Slavs complete Mochovce on their own, will it not be at the expense of safety?

[Mikhaylov] The Mochovce nuclear power plant will meet all international safety standards.

[PRAVDA] In other words, pointing out the weak aspects of nuclear power stations of the Russian type in the sphere of safety is, in your opinion, just a manifestation of competition.

[Mikhaylov] You can count on it! A genuine war—not a cold war, but a hot one—is being waged on the market for high technology. They are trying to get us everywhere, be it in China, India, or Iran.

[PRAVDA] After the signing of the agreement, the two prime ministers' replies regarding the fate of the radioactive waste from Mochovce were very general. (Vladimir Meciar: "We have come to an agreement. It is okay." Viktor Chernomyrdin: "Everything is being dealt with comprehensively.") Could you be more specific?

[Mikhaylov] First of all, you are probably thinking of spent fuel. Spent fuel is no waste. It contains a number of isotopes that can be used in the nuclear power industry again. This material, which is valuable in terms of energy, will be sent from Slovakia to Russia for reprocessing. Gradually, we will also build a storage facility in Slovakia. I think that, in the long run, local storage facilities will be established in individual countries, in which this material will be kept for 50 and, possibly, up to 100 years, before a new generation of scientists learns to utilize this energy that we cannot harness today.

Scrapping of Excess Conventional Weaponry Ended

AU0611074795 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 30 Oct 95 p 4

[Report by Jozef Jurcisin: "Slovak Army Has Fulfilled Its Commitment on the Reduction of Conventional Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the day of the publication of the results of the Statistical Office survey that showed the Army of the Slovak Republic to be the most trusted institution in Slovakia [25 October], oxygen cutter Josef Misko flame-cut in the courtyard of the Military Repair Plant No. 28 in Presov the last gun of a T-55 tank. Slovakia thereby fulfilled its commitment under the 1992 treaty on conventional armed forces. Within three years or, more accurately, since 16 November 1992, the Army of the Slovak Republic has reduced its conventional arsenal, on the basis of this treaty, by 578 excess tanks, 443 combat vehicles, 679 artillery systems, and 30 combat aircraft. Lieutenant General Julius Humaj, deputy chief of the Slovak Army General Staff, noted in this context that the process of discarding excess weaponry is beneficial for each state because it reduces the already high expenditures on these items, while the attained level "fully secures the defense capability of our country."

Regarding the reduction of conventional armament, Slovakia is on a par with its neighbors. Poland was the first former Warsaw Pact member country to have fulfilled its commitments (in September), Hungary did so a few days ago, and the Czech Republic will meet its commitment by 6 November. Following the completion of the above phase of the implementation of the treaty on conventional armed forces, the Army of the Slovak Republic has 478 combat tanks, 683 armored combat vehicles, 383 artillery systems, and 115 combat aircraft.

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Minister Seeks To Regulate Romanies' Birthrate

AU0411142195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by CTK: "Romanies Alarmed by Minister Javorsky's Statement That the Government Will Do Everything It Can So That More White Children Are Born Than Romany Children"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—Representatives of the Union of Romany Political Parties in Slovakia [URPSS] yesterday expressed alarm over Slovak Health Minister Lubomir Javorsky's statement. Addressing a Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] rally in Kosice on 26 October, Lubomir Javorsky declared, in the presence of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, other ministers, and approximately 3,000 HZDS supporters from the whole of east Slovakia, that "the government will do all it can so that more white children are born than Romany children."

In an URPSS statement signed by M. Horvath, the URPSS chairman, it is stated that Romanies' fears spring from the nationalistic undertone of Minister Javorsky's statement, and from the measures that the government is preparing for next year. According to its representatives, the URPSS observes further restriction of Romanies' rights and the deepening decline of this ethnic group. That is why URPSS representatives intend to convene in Kosice on 15 November a "general demonstration" for the fulfillment of their demands. These include the appointment of two government commissioners for Romany issues from the ranks of Romanies, financial support for Romany culture, and improved and dignified conditions for the employment of Romanies. The system of work beneficial to the public, which, according to URPSS representatives, had first been introduced for Romanies and Jews in 1938, is unjust and, in the final analysis, brings about a further decline in the social status of Romanies.

Editor Views Language Law, Effect on Publishing

AU0711110095 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 3 Nov 95 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Jozsef Szilvasi, chief editor of the Bratislava UJ SZO, by Ferenc Garzo; place and date not given: "The Slovak Language Law Penalizes the Hungarians—UJ SZO's Chief Editor Said"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft Slovak state language law will fundamentally afflict Hungarian book and newspaper publishing in Slovakia, although it has not been easy to communicate in Hungarian in various areas of life up to now, either. Jozsef Szilvasi, chief editor of the Pozsony [Bratislava] UJ SZO [new word] told NEPSZAVA: Compared to the current ambiguous situation, the Hungarians' possibilities to use their language will be narrowed, and Hungarian publications could easily find themselves in a financially disadvantaged position because of the law.

[Szilvasi] The most recently submitted draft version aims to strengthen the nation state and, to achieve this, it is to suppress the language of the Hungarian minority, just like Czech and English, from public life. According to the law in force, the Hungarian language is more or less recognized as an official language at a local level in places where Hungarian people are living. I should add, though, that this has all depended on the goodwill of officials up to now, too. However, we have been able to use our language in offices and, in fact, some Slovak officials have learned Hungarian relatively well.

When the language law is accepted, even the well-meaning Slovak officials will be forced to speak only in Slovak, and the law will rule in favor of the most narrow-minded nationalists. In other words, the situation will deteriorate even compared to the current ambiguous practice. The law even precludes the possibility for two Hungarian state officials in Revkomarom [Komarno] or Dunaszerdahely [Dunajska Streda] to speak in Hungarian. To the officials of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, the makers of the Slovak state language law claimed that the rights of the Hungarians in Slovakia would not be impaired by the new language law. This is not so. In addition, this draft also violates the Constitution because Paragraph 2 in Clause 34 of the current Constitution in force guarantees the right for members of national minorities to be educated and to be able to communicate officially in their mother tongue.

[Garzo] The current draft is the 25th version. The previous ones had some especially crude passages, which have been dropped since then.

[Szilvasi] Indeed, the previous 24 version contained many passages that were much more weird than the current one. On one hand, they wanted to end the possibility of Hungarians in Slovakia writing their name in Hungarian. It was also suggested that religious services could only be held in Slovak and all exceptions would have to be requested separately. The current draft certainly does not include these restrictions. However, I cannot emphasize enough that there is no essential change in the philosophy of the current and the previous versions. The main goal is to force the Hungarian language out of the offices and strengthen assimilation through this.

If the language law is approved, the Slovak language will be sole ruler because nothing has been said about intending to lay down in a separate law in what

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circumstances the language of the minorities could also be used.

[Garzo] How will this law affect the freedom of the press? I assume that the situation of the UJ SZO will be fundamentally affected by the parliamentary approval.

[Szilvasi] The Constitution prohibits the limitation of the freedom of the press but it can nevertheless be implemented through censorship and several economic means. Will we be able to use our own mother tongue in the press at all, and will there be Hungarian book publishing and newspapers in Slovakia? It is also a major question—and this was already the subject of debate in the 1970's—if we can use our mother tongue version of geographical names, if we can say or write the name of Pozsony or Kassa [Kosice] in Hungarian.

It is expected that some kind of language police will be set up, which will decide in each case if the newspapers are using the language correctly—if they are not, then heavy fines can be levied on them. The sum can be anything from 100,000 to 1 million Slovak korunas. It will be possible to levy such fines on the national minority papers—which are in a bad financial situation—including the UJ SZO, the only Hungarian daily in Slovakia, and this could make them cease publication within a few days. The same applies to Hungarian language book publishing in Slovakia.

I cannot see any chance of parliament's rejecting this draft. We have only a faint hope: It is possible to turn to the Constitutional Court, but the 17 Hungarian deputies are not enough for this. We must find at least 13 Slovak parliamentary deputies who think in accordance with the European value system.

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Keleti, Belgian Minister Discuss Balkans, NATO

LD0611204995 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgium supports Hungary's bid to join NATO, said Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti after receiving his Belgian counterpart, Jean-Pol Poncelet, in Budapest.

At the talks with the Belgian defense minister, who was received with military honors, the two ministers discussed security policy issues related to the Balkan crisis. For instance, Belgium has a sizeable peacekeeping force stationed in Eastern Slavonia. In case of an armed conflict, Brussels would welcome Hungary's help should the Belgian forces be compelled to leave Eastern Slavonia.

Following the meeting, Gyorgy Keleti told Newsreel that Hungary is willing to give all possible help to the Belgian contingent.

Speaking of NATO accession, the Belgian defense minister confirmed what he has already told his Hungarian counterpart—that Belgium supports Hungary's intention to join the defense organization.

[Begin recording] [Poncelet in French with superimposed Hungarian translation] This accession process has already begun and is continuing. Bilateral cooperation has been in existence for a long time between Hungary and Belgium. It is obvious that we will support your accession. [end recording]

Kovacs Interviewed on Relations With Slovakia

AU0711105195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 31 Oct 95 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Branislav Janik in Prague; date not given: "Hungarian Minister Laszlo Kovacs Regards the Delay of Treaty Ratification as a Negative Development"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We took advantage of the Prague meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] for an exclusive interview with Laszlo Kovacs, the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, whose country currently presides over the OSCE.

[Janik] Mr. Kovacs, how does Budapest assess the delay in the ratification of the basic interstate treaty on good-neighborly relations and friendship between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic until December 1995, given the Slovak prime minister's repeated assurances that it would be ratified in November at the latest and that Hungarian Prime Minister Horn had been informed about this?

[Kovacs] It is precisely because the Slovak prime minister has declared a number of times that the basic Hungarian-Slovak treaty would be ratified in November that I am personally interested in the affair. Vladimir Meciar himself made this promise.... The two prime ministers signed the treaty in March 1995 in Paris and the Hungarian National Assembly ratified it in June. Afterward, there were no announcements that the Slovak National Council would ratify the treaty by the end of its summer session. I consider this delay to be, to a certain extent, a negative development.

[Janik] The Slovak side says that the ratification has been delayed for purely technical reasons and also because more time for discussion in parliamentary committees and in parliament itself will facilitate ratification. Do you accept these arguments?

[Kovacs] I sincerely hope that this really is the last postponement of the ratification of this document and that December will finally see it ratified. Treaties are signed in the hope that they will also be ratified. Budapest proceeds clearly from the premise that both sides need the treaty. The view of our president is known that delay in the ratification, or even its abandonment, would have a negative effect on your country's prestige. Also during his negotiations with Slovak President Michal Kovac at the UN summit in New York, Arpad Goncz voiced the conviction that the Slovak National Council would ratify the treaty as soon as possible. This is in the interest of both states and their attempts to be admitted into European structures.

[Janik] The opposition of the Slovak National Party to the treaty is well known. Does this not weaken your confidence that the treaty will pass through the Slovak parliament?

[Kovacs] If the basic treaty is ratified, and I hope it will be, it will be absolutely irrelevant whether some political entity in the Slovak Republic declares that the Hungarian-Slovak treaty is not in its interest. We have been assured that this treaty is necessary and in Slovakia's interest and we proceed from this. The passing of the treaty will undoubtedly also depend on the position of the parliamentary opposition.

[Janik] Budapest has indicated that it will initiate a Horn-Meciar meeting if the draft law on the state language approved by the Slovak cabinet turns out to contradict the spirit of the basic treaty. Through the state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava has conceded the possibility of a meeting between the two prime ministers before the end of this year. Has this initiative really been triggered by the draft language law and does it mean that Budapest is concerned?

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[Kovacs] No, there is no specific plan for a meeting between Prime Ministers Horn and Meciar. Prime ministers of two neighboring states can, of course, meet at any time, even without any specific reason.

[Janik] Representatives of the Hungarian coalition in the Slovak National Council have briefed Budapest about the language law. They have mentioned, for example, that Vladimir Meciar did not keep his promise to your prime minister that the draft would be discussed with the representatives of the Hungarian minority before being approved by the government. How will Budapest react to this?

[Kovacs] I can tell you that if Prime Minister Horn thinks that the language law really gives rise to concern among the Hungarian minority, he will ask Vladimir Meciar for a meeting and for active assistance in this matter. The Slovak side keeps assuring us, however, that this law does not run counter to the spirit of the basic treaty, that the legislative changes in preparation do not contradict the basic treaty. The Slovak side claims that the treaty creates broader possibilities for solving the ethnic minorities' problems.

Even though there are some signs that this version of the bill is no less problematic than the previous one, it is a certain plus that we will be familiarizing ourselves with it through our embassy in Bratislava before the bill is passed by the Slovak parliament. That is why I said that Prime Minister Horn would react in the event of us objecting to the bill. Just as we cannot be indifferent to the time when your parliament ratifies the Hungarian-Slovak treaty, we cannot be indifferent to what kind of laws it passes and whether these are in compliance with the treaty, as the Slovak Republic has pledged.

I have no doubt that, in spite of all the problems and possible different opinions, the Hungarian and Slovak sides will find a common language, which is in the interest of both states, their nations, and ethnic minorities. I am optimistic in this regard.

Intelligence Minister Views Need for Vetting

AU0611200995 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Nov 95 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Istvan Nikolits, minister without portfolio in charge of the intelligence services, by Peter Vajda and Imre Bednarik; place and date not given: "Nikolits Will Also Be Vetted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Security bill got into a whirlwind at the latest meeting of the Hungarian National Assembly. The six-party consensus that the legislators regarded as almost secure seemed to dissipate. Among other things, we discussed this issue with Istvan Nikolits, minister without portfolio in charge of the intelligence services.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In the course of preparing this law, it seemed that a six-party agreement emerged on this bill. What has changed in a month?

[Nikolits] In my opinion, the government and the coalition parties made maximal efforts for coordination. Every party had the opportunity to describe its observations and objections in detail. Of course, the six-party coordination did not lead to full consensus, but we came close to an agreement. I found it convincing when Peter Boross, chairman of the National Security Committee, summed up the results of the work of three weeks by saying that the bill was ready to be discussed. Therefore, I find it strange that the opposition voiced so many objections after the debate in the committee. We also let legal experts examine the bill on the basis of constitutional viewpoints.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Did you invite independent legal experts or did you use your own legal experts?

[Nikolits] We also invited independent legal experts. In addition, the Constitutional Committee and the Human Rights Committee examined the bill and had no constitutional objections.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What is the meaning of the opposition's claim that you want to control parliament?

[Nikolits] We do not want to control the deputies. The agreement referred to the appointment and previous control of National Security Committee members. We supply information of considerable "depth" to the committee and the bill stipulates exemplary rights for this committee. The condition for this is that the members of the National Security Committee should be people of whom we can also be sure that there are no risk factors involved.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In other words, you want to examine the candidates with their previous agreement, just like the officials whose examination is also your task by law.

[Nikolits] Exactly that way: by filling the so-called C-type questionnaire and the relevant investigation.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What does this investigation cover?

[Nikolits] Naturally, the investigation also covers areas of private life with the threat of blackmail.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Will you investigate whether a married man has a mistress or other contacts?

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[Nikolits] Yes. Contacts outside the family and marriage, as well as contacts kept secret for some reason, or some financial contacts belong here.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Are you aware of any people in the National Assembly who are prone to blackmail?

[Nikolits] I do not suspect anyone, but we must be sure.

[NEPSZABADSAG] If the bill becomes law, including the strictest C-type control that you have suggested, how many persons will you have to examine each year?

[Nikolits] We will have to investigate about 6,000 to 7,000 persons immediately, including those fulfilling various functions. If this is done, the number of investigations will drop to a few hundred a year.

[NEPSZABADSAG] So you are going to investigate those currently fulfilling various functions. Will you and your closest coworkers also be vetted?

[Nikolits] Of course. The supplement to the bill clearly lists the circles in which vetting has to be carried out. If we failed to vet the current officials and only investigated the new ones, the whole thing would be useless. This is also important from the viewpoint of approaching Europe because security investigations are very serious in these countries and vetting is a condition in the case of certain functions. No doubt, as long as our security system functions differently, they will not hand us the secret documents and information that we need. They also want to be sure that secrecy is observed both physically and personally.

[NEPSZABADSAG] There is no law at the moment. If an ambassador is nominated today, will you investigate him or not?

[Nikolits] Investigations have always been carried out systematically in the case of ambassadors and other functions in the diplomatic service. It is now possible to do the same in the case of justified requests from other ministries. The current unsettled conditions do not allow us to investigate those who are filling a position now. A draft was in preparation on a government regulation to investigate those who currently hold official positions, but constitutional concerns have emerged in connection with this. Such a step can only be regulated by a law, and a government regulation is not enough. Therefore, I hope that the new law will emerge as soon as possible.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Still in 1995?

[Nikolits] I hope so, because this is in the interest of the whole country.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Several opposition parties have ask whether such a small country as Hungary really needs five secret services?

[Nikolits] At present, it is impossible to give a genuine answer to this question. This is precisely why we are planning to review the organizational structure and operations of the secret services along with the budget reform. In my view, this activity will take at least one year, and we will only be able to return to organizational changes after that.

[NEPSZABADSAG] The heads of the previous cabinet often said that they regard leftist extremism as the most dangerous among all extremisms. However, lately we have been primarily witnessing the strengthening of extreme-right-wing organizations. What is your opinion about this, and can you make any predictions on the basis of secret service reports on the expansion and advance of extremist organizations?

[Nikolits] It makes no difference to me whether an anticonstitutional extremist trend emerges from the "left" or from the "right." When it becomes clear about a person or an organization that his or its activity is against the Constitution and it threatens the democratic functioning of the society, it is our obligation to deal with it. I am convinced that they can really become dangerous when a general mood among the population emerges in which extremism finds followers. The events of 22-23 October proved our presumption that there are such organizations, but they are not considerable in size. Even in the current tense situation, society does not identify with the rude extremism that violates the people's basic interests. This is so, even if, in the normal framework of a democratic state, the people voice their justified dissatisfaction and dislike.

[NEPSZABADSAG] But you do not think that this justified expression of opinion includes the use of the slogans, symbols, and greetings of the Arrow Cross regime [fascist dictatorship in Hungary in the last years of World War II]?

[Nikolits] It definitely does not include that. I list this among those extremist manifestations that are dangerous for a country. Therefore, a clear legal regulation is necessary.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Are you aware of the financial sources and international contacts of these extremist elements? We must mention as a curious thing that, after the demonstration on the evening of 22 October, we saw one of the leaders of this nationalist demonstration get into a car with German license plates.

[Nikolits] I do not have such detailed information. We know that they have financial sources, and we are also aware of the fact that, generally, such groups are not isolated and they seek the obvious international contacts.

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Forint To Become Convertible on 1 Jan

AU0611083695 Paris AFP in English 0021 GMT 6 Nov 95

[Report by Eszter Szamado]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Nov 6 (AFP)—Hungary's currency, the forint, will be convertible in all current transactions from January 1 under a new foreign currency code, expected to be passed by the Socialist-majority parliament on Tuesday, finance officials told AFP.

Hungary is striving to make the forint convertible in order to gain membership in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the first half of next year, vice president of the central Hungarian National Bank (MNB) Zoltan Bodnar said.

The new law would liberalise the use of the forint in payments for foreign goods and services, but primarily in the civilian rather than the enterpreneurial sphere, Bodnar said.

Encouraged by the fact that OECD Secretary-General Jean-Claude Paye plans a visit here sometime before March, Hungary expects that the organisation's council will adopt it as a member in the second half of March, other officials said.

"But it is indispensable to pass the forex code for that," they added.

Under the new law, foreigners will no more need special permits from financial authorities when they buy property in Hungary, provided they keep to existing legislation on arable land and to local regulations.

To prevent the influx of "hot," dubious capital, the code will ban short-term foreign investment in state securities, and any security with a maturity of less than a year is considered a short-term one under this regulation.

"But its greatest advantage will be its clarity. It will lay down accurately the sort of transactions which are prohibited, the ones which are simply to be reported and the ones which have no limitations," Bodnar said.

While under the code some restrictions on capital transactions will remain in effect, with their further liberalisation only to be expected next year, companies in the future can freely exchange their forints for any currency in transactions tied to their basic activity, and transfer the lot abroad in current transactions, he added.

"But 'basic activity' will have a rather wide interpretation, so if a Hungarian private shoemaker wants to buy a Gauguin picture at a London auction, he can do it under the new code," Bodnar explained.

The code will allow Hungarian companies to take out hard currency loans and set up, without monetary restrictions, companies in OECD member states or in countries with which Hungary has an investment protection agreement.

Of course, it would not allow Hungarian tourists to freely exchange their forint banknotes abroad when they run out of their $800-per-person tourist allowance, but they can use forint-based banking cards to pay for anything around the world, Bodnar said.

Contrary to their earlier practice, Hungarians changed their preference for forint rather than hard currency private savings accounts lately, and forint savings were up by $81.5 million against a $63-million rise in hard currency savings in August, latest statistical figures by the MNB, issued this week, said.

Significant capital influx this year created sufficient liquidity on money markets, which kept interest rates low and showed that foreign investors were confident in the forint, since a system of "sliding," small devaluations of between 1.3 percent and 1.8 percent a month was introduced in March instead of earlier one-time large devaluations of between 5 and 15 percent, bank officials said.

The system practically killed all speculation against the national currency and balanced out the currency market, MNB President Gyorgy Suranyi said.

He added that the country's hard currency reserves reached $9.2 billion, which makes it possible for Hungary to repay to the IMF a $620-million part of its debt to the organisation ahead of time, in December this year instead of end-1998 as due.

He also said that the current account deficit at end-July was only $2.077 billion, $200 million less than in the same period last year.

Finance ministry officials stressed that next year, the cabinet wants to continue its restrictive policy, and, in accordance with IMF and World Bank requests, to modify the taxation and social security systems.

Austerity measures introduced this March already cut the budget deficit to 6.5 percent of the gross domestic product this year from more than 10 percent of the GDP last year, and next year, the government wants to cut it to four percent, officials added.

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President Expects 'Positive Outcome' of Talks

AU0611190495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency spoke this afternoon from Dayton with his associates in Sarajevo and assessed that the negotiations were going mostly according to plan, B-H PRESS learned from the president's office.

There are a great number of documents on the table which relate to the constitutional arrangements, military issues, refugees, human rights, and other issues. These documents are being closely studied since the largest of traps can be concealed in the tiniest of details.

Asked whether final agreement had been reached on any issue, President Izetbegovic said that negotiations had not yet moved into the deciding stage.

The situation in Mostar is on the agenda tomorrow. President Izetbegovic is convinced that factors of temporary significance are working against the federation, while factors of lasting importance are working for the federation. He is therefore certain of the success of this political project.

As for the political atmosphere in Dayton, and our chances in general, President Izetbegovic said that the developments so far at the U.S. military base had confirmed his moderate optimism, adding: I am convinced of a positive outcome since our negotiating position is superior even in its basic commitment to democracy and the concept of the widest human rights.

President Izetbegovic assessed that the talks would end over the next seven days.

Milosevic Reportedly Sees 'Deception' in Talks

AU0611153495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to an official who is participating in the Dayton negotiations and who asked to remain anonymous, the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina will go on for at least another two weeks.

The peace mediators are demanding from Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to remove criminals Karadzic and Mladic, to recognize officially Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and to secure the respect for the human rights of ethnic minorities in Serbia.

Because of the pressure on him to make concessions, the Serbian leader has accused the organizers of the negotiations of deception. He says that they have deceived him about the contents of the draft agreement. Holbrooke never mentioned these demands, Milosevic claims. He is impatiently waiting for the signing of the agreement that will lift the sanctions against his country, and he also claims that he has no influence on the Pale leadership.

The chairman of the self-styled Serb Republic Assembly said that the United States cannot expect them to accept something that is below the minimal Serb interests, even if the talks were to go on for 100 years.

Mostar Mayors To Discuss Federation in Dayton

AU0611165895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Why have the Mostar mayors, Safet Orucevic and Mijo Brajkovic, suddenly been invited to the peace negotiations in Dayton?

This is not hard to surmise following the recent speech by Hans Koschnick in Luxembourg at the EU session. He said that the Croatian side was obstructing the solution to the Mostar problem.

One of the members of the EU Administration of Mostar, who wished to remain anonymous, told our Zagreb correspondent Nada al-Issa by telephone what it was that angered Hans Koschnick the most.

Let us hear the report:

[Begin al-Issa recording] Koschnick's accusations are obviously still valid, as are the Mostar problems. The mayors are traveling to Ohio because, in short, the Washington, Brussels, Madrid agreements on Mostar and the federation are not being implemented. Mostar is still a divided city. The joint police force has not been formed. The Bosniaks are being prevented from returning to the so-called western Mostar. The Croatian police, Koschnick said in Luxembourg, is even preventing the Bosniaks from gaining access to the official premises of the EU Administration in Mostar, although that is the administration for all of Mostar. Freedom of movement is being obstructed. Koschnick accused the Croatian side in Luxembourg for all these unsolved problems. He literally said: The leaders of the Herzegovina Croats are rejecting peaceful solutions. He asked Europe, as he said, for pressure firmer than the usual diplomatic protest.

One member of Koschnick's team, who understandably wanted to remain anonymous, told us by telephone today that Koschnick had had enough when an idea was launched in eastern Mostar to link up the divided city at least symbolically. Hundreds of women and children were supposed to set off from eastern to western Mostar. However, the authorities of the so-called western Mostar prevented this very energetically. Zagreb VECERNJI

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LIST described this attempt at a peaceful protest as a stampede, which allegedly disturbed western Mostar and could have apparently provoked a war. It is unclear how women and children could have provoked or started a war. However, what is clear is that an excuse is needed to keep the city divided.

One should recall, and Koschnick said so in Luxembourg, that the Republic of Croatia has on many occasions promised to give firm support to the Mostar project and the federation. However, he said that the leadership of the Herzegovina Croats are blocking all this. A question has been in circulation for some time in Zagreb: Will Dr. Tudjman have to appoint a new leadership in western Mostar, which will implement the agreements on the federation and Mostar.

The problems have so far remained unsolved. That is why Brajkovic and Orucevic are travelling to Ohio. [end recording]

EU Official: Croats Hinder Progress in Mostar

AU0211081195 Paris AFP in English 0038 GMT 2 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 2 (AFP)—While US-brokered Bosnian peace talks started in Ohio Wednesday [2 November], the EU administrator in charge of a divided Bosnian town has attacked Bosnian Croats for hindering attempts to foster reconciliation with Moslems.

Hans Koschnik, a German official put in charge of the devastated southern Bosnian town of Mostar after negotiators ended fighting there last year, told a meeting of EU foreign ministers Monday he was considering resigning over the systematic refusal of the Bosnian Croat leadership to cooperate with the Bosnian Moslems.

Mostar, a once beautiful town on the banks of the Neretva river in southern Bosnia, was split in two by the year-long Croat-Moslem war which ended in March 1994 under pressure from Washington.

The restoration of the town, and of normal relations between the two communities, was one of the aims of the Moslem-Croat accord signed in Washington which set up a shaky Moslem-Croat federation, responsible for some of the recent military cooperation between Moslem and Croat forces.

However, in a worrying sign of the difficulties facing any attempt to produce a workable peace settlement for the whole of Bosnia, negotiators have failed to persuade the Croats to let Moslems freely into their half of town.

The Croats control the western side of the town and the Moslems control the east.

Koschnik, formerly mayor of the German town of Bremen, told EU ministers Monday he has been frustrated in his attempts by the stubborn Bosnian Croat leadership.

"Little progress has been made in the fulfilment of the task to reunite the disputing population groups in Mostar," Koschnik said in Luxembourg, according to a copy of his statement given to AFP Wednesday.

"It was not because of the people of Mostar themselves but mainly due to the politics of refusal of the Hercegovinan (southern Bosnian) Croat leadership," he said.

"Simply the good will is missing from one party ... the Croat side," the EU official said.

Koschnik said that some considerable progress had been made in physical reconstruction in Mostar.

"Knowing about the reconstruction work right after the second world war, I would dare say that we have managed to do twice as much within 15 months as what has been possible in the destroyed cities in Europe after 1945," he said.

But the Croat police do not allow the citizens of Mostar east free access to Mostar west and have harassed Moslem journalists attempting to report on the town.

The Bosnian Croats, who have declared an unrecognised statelet known as "Herzeg Bosna" in southern Bosnia, want Mostar as the "capital" of the territory they control.

Bosnian Croats were only 17 percent of the population of Bosnia before war broke out in the country in 1992 but control large swathes of the country now in an uneasy alliance with the mainly Moslem government army.

They have been heavily backed by the Croatian army and are suspected by Sarajevo of seeking to break away from Bosnia in the near future and integrate totally with Croatia.

Expelled Mostar Croats Complain to EU Official

LD0611180095 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croats expelled from the left bank of the Neretva River today sent a letter to Mostar EU Administrator Hans Koschnik. The letter reads as follows:

We have witnessed, day in day out, month in month out, your terrible pressure on the Croats of west Mostar, something we—the Croat people who have been driven out of our homes in local communities from the left bank of the Neretva—find hard to accept. We are

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inclined to believe that by systematically accusing Croats, as you find them guilty of not implementing the memorandum on understanding, you want to ensure that the Muslim side gets precisely what it desires, namely 9,150 citizens of Croat nationality from the local communities of Potoci, Vrapcici, Dreznica, Zalig, Brankovac, Luka 1, Luka 2, Carina, Gnojnice, Blagaj, and Cernica. On this occasion we refer you to the fact that Croats owned, for example in the local community of Potoci, 54.7 percent of land, which testifies best how we Croats can exercise our rights in this area.

Today, believe it or not, in this territory and in these local communities there are 54 Croats. In the local community of Potoci there is only one person of Croat nationality, while in the local community of Gnojnice there are no Croats. It seems you do not attach importance to facts because you believe it is only important to resolve the problem in an administrative way. You are not aware that in so doing you are absolving of any responsibility those who created these problems. You are not aware that you are erecting a Berlin Wall to separate us from our ancestral Croat hearths, the expelled Croats write in their letter to Hans Koschnik.

Muslim Reporting on Refugee Crisis Criticized

LD0611124795 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Next, an interesting commentary by Ivo Raguz sent from Stolac. [passage omitted]

[Raguz] The theme of homecoming is also a modern theme constantly being written about by the press and broadcast on radio stations. However, Muslim media reports in connection with this topic are charged with ideology and the aspiration to dominate, Islamize, and negate everything that is Croat. This type of reporting does not make us think about the warm atmosphere of one's home, it makes one feel disgusted and nauseous. Unfortunately certain Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina] radio reporters are contributing to this [words indistinct], particularly Nada al-Isa, the Zagreb correspondent of Sarajevo Muslim media. She is tense and struggles to cope with her emotions when she describes the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia as a so-called republic and speaks about the return of Muslim refugees as a one way street. She cannot face the truth and is trying to deceive.

This is no secret to us, particularly when one knows that our partner [the Muslim leadership] is increasingly short on patience as time is running out. They have not realized a single promise made to their people and the Islamic state envisaged by Alija Izetbegovic's Islamic declaration is further and further away. Both sides need to be willing to implement the Muslim-Croat federation if we want it to succeed and if we want the refugees to return to their Ithaca. The Muslim side is obviously lacking the will and even if this was not the case one should always bear in mind the old Latin proverb: Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes, i.e., I fear the Greeks even when they offer gifts. Therefore, the Bosnia-Herzegovina [Muslim-Croat] federation must not have its Trojan horse.

Kasagic Pledges To Seek Unity Among Serbs

LD0611164195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1551 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 6 November (SRNA)—The Serb republic prime minister-designate, Rajko Kasagic, announced he would make efforts to bring about Serb unity in the Serb republic [RS] and fight against all those trying to create conflicts.

In an interview for today's issue of GLAS SRPSKI, Kasagic recalled that our enemies and a section of the international community had been desiring these conflicts with the aim of breaking up the Serb national being west of the river Drina.

Kasagic cited as typical examples the attempt to adopt the so-called Herzegovina declaration and a group of people who had always been pushing to secure the separate interests of Krajina.

"These groups encountered the fiercest criticism in eastern Herzegovina, and it has also been shown in Krajina that they cannot gain support of the masses, because they have used up their false arguments," Kasagic said.

In connection with the emergence of the Patriotic Front of Krajina on the Banja Luka political scene and the illegal transmission of "Radio Krajina" programs, Kasagic recalled "these people feel that the war is about to end and that the time has come for them to take over power."

"'Radio Krajina' is a pirate radio station, which does not have a licence to broadcast programs, but the fact that the people have hiding in a military building, which is being protected by Zolje antitank missiles, says everything about these people," Kasagic said.

He added that the RS information ministry would not have had made any problems for the station if an application for its registration had been submitted.

"The issue of individuals being insulted and attacked groundlessly is the issue of their morals," Kasagic said.

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Banja Luka Party Supports Multiethnic State

AU0611181695 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 5 Nov 95 p 5

[Article by R. Vujatovic: "Nation's Right to Self-Determination"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka—The United Left of the Serb Republic, which was founded in Banja Luka yesterday, has as the priority task of its activities, the establishment of an urgent and just peace that implies the right of every nation to freedom and self-determination. In accordance with this, the United Left of the Serb Republic is committed to the reestablishment of cultural, economic, communications, political, and other links among the nations of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of the present and future organization of their state constitution.

Three political parties and four organizations have entered the United Left of the Serb Republic: The League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, the Liberal Party, the Workers Union, the SUBNOR [WWII veterans organization], the Women's League, the Association of War Veteran Pensioners, and the Intellectuals Club of Doboj. Mile Ivosevic from Doboj was elected chairman of the United Left.

At the founding assembly, Dr. Mico Carevic presented the program of the United Left. He stressed several times that the program of the United Left of the Serb Republic states that a multiethnic society on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina was still possible and that the concept of an ethnically pure state did not have a chance since such a concept only continued to exist in the heads of ethnic puritans. Speaking of the current situation in the Serb Republic, Carevic said that this war was started by nationalistic forces in all nations. He referred to them as the fifth column that had close links with the centers of world power, which wanted Yugoslavia to fall apart.

Serb Commentary Views 'Counterproductive' Media

AU0211134495 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 24 Oct 95 p 2

[Commentary by Branislav Ribar: "Dilettantes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The critics of current events, and particularly the critics of the military circumstances, the number of whom are increasing every day, claim, angrily and mostly without corroborating their assertions, that the Serbs in the Serb Republic have lost the media war. This too-severe and basically groundless assertion can be refuted by one single, easily explainable argument: We have not waged a media war, so we could not lose it!

The question is, however, whether the Serb Republic was capable of getting involved in a media war at all. The main precondition for that is a capacity in terms of cadre and material-technical means.

As is known, as early as in the first days of the war, the Serb Republic was left without much of the media infrastructure. It is sufficient to recall the loss of the Sarajevo television center with its valuable modern equipment and then the OSLOBODJENJE building with its printing house, computers, and machinery necessary for publishing.

In addition to all those difficulties, there are few experienced Serb correspondents who stood up for the defense of Serbianhood and the Christian orthodox creed and placed their pens or cameras at their service. The majority of them fled abroad at the very beginning, in April 1992, but the number who remained faithful to their shamelessness as new Turkish converts and who are openly spitting on their orthodox roots even today is also not insignificant.

So, in such circumstances, the first generation of correspondents in the Serb Republic grew and gained experience. Understandably, a media war, being one of the special forms of warfare, is not waged by a team of journalistic apprentices and beginners and with modest material-technical means.

Therefore it is unbecoming and unjustifiable to criticize the journalists in the Serb Republic because of their alleged defeat in the media war. Moreover, it would be pretentious. Mistakes and disorientation, of which we have had plenty so far, are far more obvious than the defeat in the media war. It is not without reason that the political leadership of the Serb Republic has expressed dissatisfaction with the system of information, as well as the need for more-radical changes.

It is high time that a cadre consolidation was carried out in the field of journalism in the youngest Serbian state, and also because of the dignity of the profession, which has been reduced to an insulting level. The professional attitude in journalism in the Serb Republic has fallen quite low. Dilettantism and incompetence are simply ravaging the media. The most prominent posts in jouranalism have been filled by former warehouse workers, railroad conductors, cashiers, social workers....Most of them have joined the media, after having suddenly discovered their talents for journalism, in order to dodge the trenches and front lines.

A review of the staff in the media houses of the Serb Republic would reveal various professions from

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which "reinforcements" have been recruited in the past months. The consequences of the professional retraining due to the war are most drastic in journalism. Not infrequently the public is served information that creates completely counterproductive effects. In certain parts of the Serb Republic, many people will tell you that they are more upset by reports by some of "our" journalists, or some "information services," than by all the lies and fabrications broadcast by the Muslim and the Croatian radio and TV stations.

Most of those reports are identical, as if they were written according to a pattern, which is constantly being expanded by new, topical elements. All of them end with an awkward sentence: "The shelling caused no losses among the Serb soldiers." It is the same every day, and sometimes even three or four times a day.

It is high time that media houses in the Serb Republic "thanked" its journalists-apprentices for their contribution—perhaps even in the way painter Apels addressed a shoemaker at one of his exhibitions: "Ne sutor ultra crepidam!" ("Shoemaker, stick to your last!")—because journalism is not a simple craft, and certainly not one that can be learnt overnight. It is a very difficult and dangerous profession, one of those that have been assessed by the WHO as one of the most hazardous because of frequent work under stress. Journalists are not, nor should they be, mere record keepers of other people's words or speeches, although they sometimes have to play that role as well. Frequently, (and this refers to true professionals) they are revisors of the official policy, and sometimes even its opponents. One cannot become this overnight, although, looking from safe distance, it appears all too simple.

Serbs Accuse Police of Abandoning Front Lines

AU0511155195 Paris AFP in English 1511 GMT 5 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 5 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serb army on Sunday [5 November] accused police of abandoning their defence of front lines, warning that Moslem-Croat forces were capable of launching new attacks at any time.

In a statement received Sunday by AFP, the headquarters of the Bosnian Serb army said Tomislav Kovac, interior minister of the self-proclaimed republic, issued an order on November 2 to pull out special police forces deployed along separation lines with Moslem-Croat federation troops.

The statement said Kovac's order was highly dangerous, given that "the war is not over" and that "independently of the peace process, the Croatian and Moslem forces can launch new offensives."

It described the order as "very unreasonable" and urged Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to prevent it from being implemented.

Police and armed forces should continue their cooperation until the war was definitively over, the statement added.

This spat is the latest incident in a conflict which dates back to the spring, pitting the Bosnian Serb military against civilian leaders.

In August, Vojska magazine, the mouthpiece of the Bosnian Serb army, accused Karadzic of giving preferential treatment to special police units by fitting them out with the most modern arms, at the expense of the army.

The magazine said Karadzic hoped to build up an elite police force capable of defending his regime in the event of social unrest or military insurrection.

Army Rejects UN Claims Against Mujahedin Unit

LD0411211995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The information service of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps has issued the following statement with the aim of providing true information about alleged interception of British humanitarian convoys and units of the British battalion by the Mujahedin unit:

In response to latest UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] reports claiming that certain groups have been intercepting and stopping convoys without permission from competent authorities, and alleging that certain members of the Mujahedin unit took part in the incidents, we energetically deny all these obviously premeditated and compromising statements. It is interesting that certain media published these reports without checking their accuracy.

UNPROFOR representatives have published inaccurate reports on several occasions since the murder of a soldier of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and a member of our 3d Corps Mujahedin unit, who was killed recently by soldiers of the British [UNPROFOR] battalion between Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf.

They interpreted routine control of an army checkpoint as an interception of a convoy. They said that two UNPROFOR soldiers were captured, when all they had done was to ask to speak with the local Bosnian military command. These media manipulations are an effort to hide the truth and conceal the seriousness of the murder of a soldier who had still not recovered from wounds suffered during the liberation of Vozuca.

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Finally, we dissociate ourselves from any illegal acts, and all of them will be sanctioned adequately [as received]. The Mujahedin unit is one of the most disciplined units in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its soldiers are now carrying out their regular military duties after brilliant victories on Mt. Ozren.

Abdic Supporters Seen Returning to Velika Kladusa

AU0311144295 Paris AFP in English
1411 GMT 3 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Nov 3 (AFP)—Dissident Moslems from the Bihac region in northwest Bosnia, who have sought refuge in Croatia for three months, have begun to trickle back to their hometown, the UN refugee agency said Friday.

A handful of one-time supporters of renegade Moslem leader Fikret Abdic have left the Vojnic camp in southern Croatia bound for the northwest Bosnian town of Velika Kladusa, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman Ron Redmond said.

The Vojnic camp has housed as many as 20,000 Abdic supporters, who fled Bihac in early August in the face of an onslaught by Bosnian army forces, who freed the former enclave from a three-year stranglehold applied by Bosnian Serbs in conjunction with their Abdic-supporting allies.

The UNHCR is laying on buses to encourage the refugees to return to Velika Kladusa, north of Bihac.

Monday, 12 Moslems joined the agency vehicle, while on Wednesday 43 others took advantage of the UN facility despite intimidation by armed men still loyal to Abdic, Redmond said.

A third bus will leave Vojnic on Friday, Redmond said, adding that the success of these initial repatriations will hopefully persuade others that it is safe to return.

The UNHCR remains concerned, meanwhile, about the fate of some 13,000 other Moslem and Croat refugees in the region around the Serb stronghold of Banja Luka, Redmond said.

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President's Office Announces New Government

LD0711123995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Article 98, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, and on the proposal of Zlatko Matesa, prime minister of the Republic of Croatia, appointed under decision 01 95 1758/1 of 4 November 1995, the president of the Republic of Croatia has issued the decision to appoint the deputy prime ministers and other members of the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

The following are appointed deputy prime ministers and members of the government of the Republic of Croatia:

Borisav Skegro—deputy prime minister in charge of economy and finances

Dr. Mate Granic—deputy prime minister and foreign minister

Dr. Jure Radic—deputy prime minister and development and reconstruction minister

Dr. Ivica Kostovic—deputy prime minister in charge of humanitarian issues and science minister

Dr. Ljerka Mintas Hodak—deputy prime minister in charge of internal policy and the social sector

Gojko Susa—defense minister

Ivan Jarnjak—internal affairs minister

Bozo Prka—finance minister

Davor Stern—economy minister

Ivan Penic—minister for privatization and property management [upravljane imovinom]

Mate Jankovic—minister of agriculture and forestry management

Ivica Mudrinic—maritime affairs, transport, and communications minister

Dr. Andrija Hebrang—health minister

Bozo Biskupic—culture minister

Ljilja Vokic—education and sports minister

Niko Bulic—tourism minister

Joso Skara—labor and social welfare minister

Marina Dropulic Matulovic—urban development, construction, and housing minister

Miroslav Separovic—justice minister

Davorin Mlakar—administration minister

Marijan Petrovic—minister in the Government of the Republic of Croatia in charge of coordination and the diaspora [koordinacija i iseljenistvo]

Branko Mocibob—minister in the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

The decision comes into effect on the day of issue, the office of the president of the Republic has announced.

Opposition Parties Allege Election 'Manipulations'

LD0611185095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1807 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 6 (TANJUG)—The leaders of Croatia's two biggest opposition parties, the Peasants' Party and the Social-Liberal Party, have accused the ruling Croatian Democratic Union of securing the victory in the elections through manipulations.

Zlatko Tomcic, leader of the Croatian Peasants' Party that has won the majority opposition vote together with four other coalition partners, told the Split opposition weekly FERAL TRIBUNE that President Franjo Tudjman's ruling party had won slightly under 40 percent of the mandate.

The rest of the vote has been secured through the electoral law and irregularities in constituencies, he said.

"The world public should help us secure just and fair elections... we have to call for international protection," he said.

Tomcic stressed that his party possessed reports stating that international observers had made a series of objections to Croatia's Electoral Law and the way elections had been held.

He said, "we shall be patient, we shall wait for final election returns to be released and international bodies' reports, and then it might happen that we call for international arbitration."

He said the number of seats planned for Croats in the diaspora, specifically Bosnian Croats, was the most controversial issue of the electoral law which he said made the law undemocratic.

The Croatian Democratic Union has expected more than 400,000 Croats in the diaspora to vote in the elections, while just over 80,000 Croats have done so, he said.

Tomcic also said a large number of Serbs had left Croatia, saying the election returns would be slightly different if they had voted.

Drazen Budisa, leader of the Social-Liberal Party, said also in an interview with FERAL TRIBUNE that there was evidence of electoral manipulations and corrupt

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electoral practices, pinning the blame for it on the Croatian Democratic Union.

He said a large number of citizens had not voted in the elections, saying that that, too, spoke of their dissatisfaction with the Croatian Democratic Union's policy, but also of their dissatisfaction with the opposition.

Budisa also said no greater changes should be expected in Croatia after the elections, and said "the role of the government and parliament will be reduced to carrying out President Tudjman's decisions."

Artillery Weapons Tested in Western Zagreb

LD0711095195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An announcement for the population of Zagreb: From 0900 to 1200 today, artillery weapons will be tested in the western part of the city. Citizens are asked not to be disturbed by the resulting detonations.

UN Official on Croatian Abuses Against Serbs

LD0711102795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0929 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Nov 6 (TANJUG)—Special U.N. rapporteur for human rights in the former Yugoslavia Elisabeth Rehn accused the Croatian authorities of drastic violations of the human rights of Serbs in sectors 'north' and 'south' in the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) during and after Croatia's August aggression on the territory.

Rehn placed the accusations, substantiated by comprehensive solid evidence, at the beginning of her first report, in her capacity of U.N. special rapporteur, to U.N. Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and the General Assembly, TANJUG learnt on Monday.

Faced with the Croatian aggression on sectors 'north' and 'south' of RSK, called 'Storm,' about 200,000 Serbs were forced to flee and only 5,000 of them have stayed in their homes, Rehn said.

The special rapporteur cited the main segments of Croatian practice during and after the 'Storm': brutal treatment, by Croatian troops and civilians, of the Serbian people on their way out of Croatia, shelling during the offensive of Serb cities and villages without any military importance (for example Knin and Glina), murdering of Serbs who stayed in RSK, plundering of Serb property, and the setting ablaze and ruthless destruction of Serb houses.

Although the Croatian authorities claim that they will allow Serb refugees to return to their homes, Rehn concludes that, unfortunatly, reality was different. Many Serb houses are burnt and destroyed and the Croatian authorities are posing bureaucratic obstacles to prevent the return of Serb refugees, Rehn said in her report.

The report of the new special U.N. rapporteur, which is not yet available for the public, is completely different from the 17 reports filed by her predecessor Tadeus Mazowieski, who always blamed Serbs for all the crimes and human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia.

Rehn wrote her 37-page report after her first mission to the former Yugoslavia last month during which she visited Zagreb, Sarajevo, Pale, Belgrade and other places in RSK.

In the part of her report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rehn said that the all the parties to the conflict—Muslims, Croats and Serbs—were violating human rights.

In that part of her report, Rehn paid special attention to developments in the Bihac region (western BiH) from where about 25,000 Muslims have fled. These Muslims support Fikret Abdic who is opposed to the war policy of Alija Izetbegovic. Rehn also paid special attention to the regions of Banja Luka (northwest BiH) and Srebrenica (eastern BiH). She said that when she met with Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Republika Srpska, state of Bosnian Serbs, she asked for permission that her representatives visit Banja Luka and Srebrenica and check out the accusations made against the Serb side, but that she did not get a firm promise.

The part of her report on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Rehn starts with the observation that the Yugoslav authorities have been fully supportive of her mission and that they are ready and open for talks about all aspects of human rights.

Rehn said that the problems the FRY is facing are first of all humanitarian, due to the negative effects of U.N. sanctions against the FRY and the difficulties that arise in finding accomodation for approximately 700,000 refugees.

Serbs Write to Christopher Voicing 'Concern'

LD0611172995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1628 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad, 6 Nov (SRNA)—Milan Milanovic, the head of the Srem-Baranja Regional Council and chief Serb negotiator at the talks concerning the status of eastern Slavonia, has voiced concern for the fate of some 200,000 of the region's inhabitants.

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In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and international mediators Peter Galbraith and Thorvald Stoltenberg, Milanovic underlines that he appreciates their efforts to reach peace in former Yugoslavia and, welcoming the Dayton agreement reached by Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, he voices his readiness to continue with negotiations.

At the same time, he draws attention to the fact that the Serb criticism of the basic agreements on the status of eastern Slavonia is reasonable.

Milanovic said "we must voice the Serb side's concern for the fate of some 200,000 of region's inhabitants," recalling that "the Croatian authorities do not observe human rights on territories under their control, and specifically in Sectors South, West, and North, where people have been expelled, houses burned down, and civilians killed."

According to Milanovic, Srem and Baranja have never been a part of the Republic of Croatia and the regions's citizens do not trust the Croatian authorities because of their past experiences and because "it is very easy to predict the future."

"This is the reason why we urge the United Nations to administrate the region during the transitional period, because we are certain that the Croatian authorities will not respect human rights," Milanovic says in the letter to Christopher, Galbraith, and Stoltenberg.

Helsinki Group Says Tudjman Broke Pardon Promise

AU0611220595 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 95 p 6

[Article by Ivica Djikic: "Promise About Pardon Broken"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—Three days after SLOBODNA DALMACIJA had reported that I asked NATO in Tuzla to bomb Croatia, which has nothing to do with the truth, an attempt was made to blow up my family holiday home on a Dalmatian island. Fortunately, one of our observers happened to be there and he managed to prevent the attack. We have sent evidence to the International Tribunal for War Crimes in The Hague against SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, as this paper is inciting crimes by publishing untrue information. This was stated by Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, president of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, at a news conference on 2 November. He read to the journalists HHO [Croatian Helsinki Committee] Proclamation No. 29, which refers to mass violation of human rights in the newly liberated areas of the Republic of Croatia—that is, in the former Sectors North and South. Cicak also spoke about a forced eviction on Ruder Boskovic Street in Split on 30 October. According to him, Zeljko Rincic and several of his friends tried to evict Goran Radanovic, a member of the 141st brigade, and his wife and two children from their apartment. This led to a shoot out and the use of a hand grenade, in which Davor Zovko was killed and several persons wounded.

"There are between 1,000 and 1,300 people of Serb nationality in Croatian prisons. They either surrendered themselves or were captured in Operation Storm, and they are subjected to horrific police torture on a daily basis. President Tudjman has, therefore, broken his promise of granting a pardon to all those who surrender to the Croatian authorities," Cicak said. He also stressed that only 2,000 people have returned to the liberated Croatian territories because everything has been destroyed, everything ranging from transformer stations, post offices, schools, to Orthodox churches. Cicak said that the Croatian and Serb Helsinki Committees are preparing detailed reports on the situation concerning human rights in Croatia between 1991 and 1995.

"The safety of people who have stayed to live in the liberated areas of Croatia has slightly improved recently, but the lives of these people are still not worth much as they are still tortured, murdered, and their property stolen. Recently they have been deprived of heaters and wood for fire in particular," Petar Mrkalj, executive secretary of the HHO, said. Drago Pilsel, member of the HHO Presidium, spoke about the situation at the cemetery in Gracac that he had recently visited.

"The last grave in the cemetery carries number 753, but it is possible that some graves contain more than one body and that there are mass graves. Therefore, we insist that all graves in the Gracac cemetery be exhumed so that the exact number of those buried can be determined," Pilsel said at the end, handing out photographs of the Gracac cemetery to the journalists.

TV Introduces Revised Programming Policy

LD0611223595 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session today, the Council of Croatian Radio and Television (HTV) presented a new programming orientation for the period from September 1995 to July 1996. The new programming orientation envisages an increased share, 60 percent, of domestic TV production in all three programs. What else is new in the HTV programming orientation?

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] First, it addresses two key issues—technical capacities and a financial construction, HTV director Ivan Parac stresses.

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Following the military and political changes of 1995, conditions have been created for a different kind of work in HTV. The first and the second program now cover 98 percent of Croatia's territory. The third program covers about 97 percent. This is precisely what conditions the new programming orientation.

[Parac] The first and second programs will be national programs, in that they will be programs of general significance to the entire Republic of Croatia, all its citizens. The first program will be slightly more serious, whereas the second should be slightly more casual. The third program should in principle be a commercial entertainment and sports program.

[Correspondent] Another significant change relates to satellite production, which will no longer include only rebroadcasts of programs but programs produced for Croatians in the diaspora. The new programming orientation will usher in a number of new programs which were presented by editor Hloverka Novak-Srzic.

[Novak-Srzic] In particular, there will be a whole series of programs about economics. We are reintroducing into the national network the Croatia Today program, something that will treat Croatia in a regional way. In addition, we will keep regional and local programs on the third program. We are also introducing another new program—Week in Culture. Twice a month there will a new program, in conjuction with TV Parliament and the Press Club.

[Correspondent] In the context of new programs, one should also draw attention to a program about the Croatian Army. Likewise, editor Novak-Srzic says, the program orientation will include topical programs relating to the renovation and development of Croatia. During a brief debate following the presentation of the new orientation, members of the council aired their opinions on the merits of the draft concept.

[Parac] Thank you for your contribution. We are going to work in line with this scheme. At the next session of the council, we are going to present this scheme and add what has been said here. I assume that some of you present will also be members of that next council. If nothing else, we will formally verify this program.

[Correspondent] Let us finally say that the new HTV scheme will be launched on 11 November. [end recording]

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'Dirty Money' Reportedly Used for Gligorov Attack

AU0711091195 Skopje MIC in English 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The assassination attempt on President Kiro Gligorov was financed by dirty money from Serbia or Russia, the weekly "Monitor" from Podgorica claims, Makfaks reports. Calling upon the statement of an anonymous member of the Yugoslav military service for counter-intelligence (KOS), the "Monitor" claims that "dirty money" was used to form companies in Sofia, Skopje and Thessaloniki, and that this triangle financed the assassination.

The source further claims that Sofia, Skopje and Thessaloniki have become centers for violation of the embargo, and that these firms formed with dirty money are "a service of the Serbian mafia which smuggles petrol, beside others, for General Mladich as well." "The advisory body of the firms of the mentioned triangle is the former KOS, while the KGB is most probably concentrated in at least two companies in Sofia," the source claims, adding that "it wouldn't be wise to quote their names in the newspaper."

According to the former operative, President Gligorov was a "target" a long time before the assassination attempt itself, but nobody believed either Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] or Gligorov would survive for so long. The direct motive for the assassination was Gligorov's policy of opening the door to "clean money" from the West, which leaves the mafia without work.

The assassination plot started by "bribing the Macedonian political peak," the source claims. In support of his thesis, he quotes minister Frckovski as talking "discreetly" about a "conspiracy" in the Macedonian political peak.

As part of this, he says that minister Frckovski said that the assassins intended to "change the government structure and to bring a team that would directly execute the instructions of the conspirators," which means, the source concludes, that "there is a reserve team in Macedonia, which is located somewhere around the Macedonian Government."

"The conspirators are now somewhere deep in the background. They are shielded by the darkness of the mutual political calculations, which, if they were to be revealed in public, could jeopardize the positive processes that, in the long run, are positive for the U.S.A., Macedonia and NATO," the anonymous source says, who is presented in the weekly "Monitor" as a former operative of the counter-intelligence service of the former Yugoslav National Army.

Delayed Decision on Frckovski Resignation Viewed

AU0311110995 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 1 Nov 95 p 3

[Commentary by Z. Darkovska: "The Prime Minister Is Still Meditating"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A week has passed since Ljubomir Frckovski offered a written resignation to Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski on the position of minister of the interior, and it is still unclear (at least as far as public opinion is concerned) whether it will be accepted or not. It is true that there is no defined deadline by which the prime minister has to decide on the resignation of a member of his cabinet who is also a member of his party, the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], but in spite of this, public opinion is entitled to expect a solution of the whole case.

The prime minister, who is the only one qualified to decide on the resignation, is obviously still contemplating what to do. However, it is practically impossible to find out which way the decision will go, because contacts between him and the journalists have been made impossible. All our attempts to get a statement, since the first day Frckovski's resignation was submitted, have remained without success. There are constant responses from Branko Crvenkovski's cabinet that he is too busy, alongside a discreet piece of information that every further attempt to discuss this subject will remain futile. On the other hand, minister spokesman Gjuner Ismail says that as soon as the prime minister has an announcement to make, he will do so personally. In his opinion, Crvenkovski has not yet made a decision, not because he is too busy, but simply because he is still thinking about the best solution. Ismail has already explained to our newspaper that it is a serious decision to make, and, therefore, it must not be made in haste and that time is required.

We also inquired whether the party headed by the prime minister, that is the SDSM, has had any discussions on Ljubomir Frckovski's resignation, first of all, because one of their members is head of such an important department. The members of the SDSM with whom we discussed yesterday say that the party has not had any such discussions. If president of the party, Branko Crvenkovski, finds it necessary, he can arrange such discussions. However, they all agree that the resignation has nothing to do with the party and that it is a matter for the mandator. So, consultative discussions within a certain circle of people are possible, but they are not compulsory. It is another question how large this circle is, who belongs to it, who is included in deciding about the resignation of the minister of the interior, what it

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means when they claim that "so far no discussions have been held on this topic," and whether any discussions have been organized on another topic so far. Nobody is ready to talk about this.

On the other hand, the possible variations concerning the resignation, as we have already written about before, are either to accept it or not. If the prime minister decides to accept it, then it is his duty to inform the Macedonian Assembly which elects the government about this act that practically implies termination of a minister's mandate. If the prime minister does not accept the offered resignation, Frckovski continues to be a member of the government, but with a suffix "in resignation" on his title. In case this happens, the least the prime minister has to do is to give an explanation for his decision. In that case Frckovski will remain as minister and his resignation will not be accepted as long as this government's mandate is valid, unless he himself insists on quitting the ministerial position, and such instruments do exist.

Self-Government Law 'Marginalizes' Albanian Tongue

AU0711104895 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 2 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by I. Arsllani: "Albanian Political Forces Must Review Their Activities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetovo, 1 Nov—The Self-Administration Law in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which was approved by parliament a few days ago without the votes of the Albanian deputies and fills a five-year-long legal vacuum in the work of the communes, has rounded off the fourth level of the hierarchy of the state. This extremely complex law underwent 10 revisions; official circles state that similar laws of many European countries were consulted and that the bill went through the expert hands of representatives of the Council of Europe. It marks a firm break with the system of government by assemblies, and encourages local self-administration with local authorities, town prefects, councils of between 13 and 25 members, and other executive and administrative bodies. The law claims to ensure that power is decentralized, and makes extensive provisions for the units of local self-administration and the equality of citizens, or so its authors believe. In their view, the law cannot be applied immediately, but will be introduced at the end of 1996, because it is expected that a law on the country's territorial division will be approved in July next year, and one on local elections a few months later.

Albanian Language Marginalized

Unfortunately, the Albanians in Macedonia cannot be satisfied with this law, because it marginalizes the Albanian language even more than the restrictions in the present Constitution, especially in the units of local self-administration in which there is what is called a "considerable" number of Albanians, i.e., more than 20 percent. These administrative units include almost all the Albanian-populated towns apart from Tetovo and Gostivar, whose populations are more than 50 percent Albanian and are counted as communes with an Albanian majority. Because of a "defect" in the most recent census, not even Debar, which is 90 percent Albanian, can be included.

Besides the use of the Albanian language and alphabet alongside Macedonian in the communes of Tetovo and Gostivar, an additional government proposal that is included in the law, but has little chance of being enforced in practice, states that "In those units of local self-administration in which there is a considerable number of members of a nationality, i.e., over 20 percent, the signs of firms and public institutions may also be written in the language of the nationalities, if the Communal Council decides." This amendment was supposedly added on the suggestion of the experts of the Council of Europe, but is in fact an empty phrase that ensures no practical measures will be taken, if the decision is to be left to the communal council in which the Albanians are a minority, even if their number is "considerable." According to this amendment, the Albanian language could be officially used in the towns of Kumanovo, Debar, Struga, Kicevo, and Krusevo, and in four communes of Skopje: Central Skopje, Karpos, Gazibaba, and Cair.

The Albanian deputies, as the justice minister who is authorized to bring this law into effect will admit, advocated from the start improvements to the quality and content of the text in order to ensure equal rights for all citizens in Macedonia, and thus for the Albanians, too. They asked for the Albanians to be able to use their mother tongue officially wherever they live, and for more responsibilities for the communes, in order to prevent discrimination against the nationalities and to protect them from the central authority. They asked for power to be decentralized in the direction of the local administrative units, which would have stronger autonomy, and the rights to associate in regional bodies, to nominate officials to the regional ministries, to implement national quotas in employment policies, etc. However, the government representative took no heed to any of these things and the text of the bill was approved as the Macedonian Government had proposed it, without even the amendment of the Political

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Commission of the Macedonian Assembly in connection with Article 95, introduced on the instructions of the Council of Europe, according to which the language of the nationalities can optionally be used in communes in which the nationalities do not constitute a majority but only 30-40 percent of the population. The Party of Democratic Prosperity chairman's amendment that sought the removal of the entire chapter regulating the official use of languages, on the basis that it was more restrictive than the Constitution, was also rejected.

Albanian Proposals Not Considered

Albanian deputies consider that the law has not taken a single step forward in this sphere, because the official use of the languages of the nationalities has not been provided for according to Article 7 of the Macedonian Constitution which guarantees the use of the Albanian language in local administrative units. It is obvious that this law restricts the democratic rights of Albanian citizens and divides them into two groups, a form of unprecedented discrimination. The legislators' persistent refrain that the law has been based on democratic and modern methods therefore does not hold water, and the law's irrationality will become evident in practice.

The Albanians in Macedonia favor solving key problems in a democratic fashion, through dialogue and within the system. By refusing to consider the constructive proposals of the Albanian deputies in connection with the law, the Macedonian state has again affirmed its national conception of the state where the Albanian problem is concerned. A silent agreement exists among the partners in the coalition not to jeopardize the Macedonians' essential rights. It is now up to Albanian political forces to review the policy they are pursuing and to turn their attention to more pugnacious and radical methods of solving problems, remembering that this model of local self-administration is neither perfect, definitive, nor eternal, as its authors believe, but can be changed.

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Foreign Minister Reflects on Death of Rabin

WS0611160395 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Nov 95 p 1

[Untitled commentary by Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski on the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin]

[FBIS Translated Text] I see the death of Yitzhaq Rabin as a deeply shocking manifestation of the fanatic blindness even people in the civilized world are prone to. A Nobel Peace Prize winner was killed for what was one of his most important life achievements: his personal contribution to peace. He was killed because he had the courage to prevent bloodshed, because he, an old soldier, wanted to put an end to the killings of Jews and Arabs.

A young Jew murdered one of the heroes of the war for the sovereign state of Israel—a widely recognized and respected soldier and politician. The future will show how much harm this death has done to Israel and the world.

Poland has lost in Yitzhaq Rabin a wise partner, open-minded and friendly, one of the guests of honor at the celebrations commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1993, a supporter of a rational development of relations between the state of Israel and our state. He expressed this on numerous occasions, among others during a conversation he held with me last May in Jerusalem, with the curtness of a soldier and the wisdom of a statesman.

I think that Jews in Israel and all over the world, the Arabs, and every one of us—people who seek solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems—have sustained a tremendous loss.

My thoughts and feelings today are with those for whom this death was the hardest blow, most of all with the Jewish nation and the state of Israel. Reason and experience tell me that, as has already happened in the past, the act of hatred to which an extraordinary man fell victim will evolve to represent the values he died for. He died like a soldier on the most difficult war front of all—in the battle for peace and common sense.

—Wladyslaw Bartoszewski

Walesa Aides, Backers Comment on Results, Future

WS0611135895 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by "PAD," K.Gr.: "Certain of Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] "When he began his campaign, he had only 8-percent support. We have already almost managed to restore the real image of the president. We will do the rest before the second round. If the right wing is reasonable, it should back Lech Walesa," said [campaign staff head] Jerzy Gwizdz. Solidarity ["S"] press spokesman Piotr Zak was glad that Lech Walesa's result was close to the one he achieved in 1990 (he received 40 percent then). "He turned out to be practically the only post-Solidarity force—if one can call a man a force—that has been able to maintain the result achieved five years ago." Zak announced that "S" would be mobilized and would more actively participate in Lech Walesa's campaign before the second round. [passage omitted]

Asked by RZECZPOSPOLITA for comment, [Belweder] Minister Andrzej Zakrzewski said that such a result could be expected. "The biggest phenomenon of the campaign was the rebirth of Walesa in the eyes of the people. It was all the more difficult because his rivals united in their attacks on him. One of the losers of the elections is the Electoral Law, which enabled so many candidates, even political-folklore types, to run in the elections. Candidates who waged an aggressive campaign lost. 'Let us choose the future' was not only Kwasniewski's slogan. The winner was the president, who said: 'We know where we are, we know where we are going, but we must remember where we came from.'" Zakrzewski also said that the president does not rule out the possibility of cooperating in the near future with politicians coming from post-Solidarity parties that fielded their own candidates in the elections. [passage omitted]

What Campaign in the Second Round?

Unofficial information that came from circles closely related to the president suggests that, even though he was sure he would run in the second round, Lech Walesa was nervously awaiting the election results. In the event he failed, a so-called black version of the president's statement for the media was prepared, which the president would have given on Sunday night. [passage omitted]

For the next two weeks Walesa's campaign will be similar to that waged so far.

Walesa's campaign staff intends to propose to Aleksander Kwasniewski that the debate of both presidential candidates be held with the participation of representatives of their political bases, representatives who will assume posts in the presidential Chancellery when one of the candidates wins. The debate would be devoted to international problems, problems of security and defense, as well as economic issues. The incumbent president would be accompanied by, among others, Andrzej Olechowski.

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The president will visit between 10 and 20 places before the second round of the elections. First he will most probably go to Szczecin, which he was unable to visit a week ago. In line with preliminary decisions, he will also visit regions where support for Walesa and Kwasniewski was more or less the same.

Walesa-Kwasniewski Debates Set for 12, 15 Nov

LD0611194195 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1900 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The television debates with the participation of Aleksander Kwasniewski and Lech Walesa will probably be held on 12 and 15 November [as heard]. On Sunday, 12 November, the presidential candidates are to discuss international issues, and on Wednesday, 15 November, they will discuss home affairs, Stanislaw Nowak, a member of the Polish Television Board responsible for program matters, has said. The debates are to start at 2005 [1905 GMT] and will be broadcast on the First Program.

Television representatives will discuss the details of the debates with the candidates' electoral committees. We will have more information on this subject on Wednesday, Nowak said. He added that the programs will most probably be presented by journalists. The two candidates will be the main heroes of the debates, he stressed.

Kwasniewski suggested to Walesa the holding of a joint public debate last night after the first round of the elections had ended. Today the president said on Radio Three that he will make efforts to hold such a debate.

Walesa To Show People Kwasniewski's 'Nonsense'

LD0611191995 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Lech Walesa has expressed the conviction that he will certainly win the second round of the elections. Speaking on Polish radio, he said that the result he achieved in the first round was a good one, if one takes into account the five years of difficult reforms.

Lech Walesa said that he is prepared to take part in a public debate with Aleksander Kwasniewski in order to, as he put it, show the nation the nonsense of his philosophy.

[begin Walesa recording] I will endeavor to do this. I will try to show the rhetoric and the nonsense in Kwasniewski's philosophy. That is why I want to show this to the nation; I will do this with pleasure because I am sure the people will draw their conclusions. [end recording]

[Presenter] President Walesa also said that National Bank President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz and Ombudsman Tadeusz Zielinski should resign because of their political activities. (endall) 061800 wall/ks 06/1921

Support for Walesa From Former Ministers

WS0711114095 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Nov 95 p 1

["Text" of letter by former Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, former Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, former Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and former Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka: "For Lech, NATO and the EU"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It remains crucial for Poland to have a politician who will be consistent in strengthening our sovereignty and swiftly lead us into NATO and the EU as president. Our membership in these organizations will be the top priority of the president in the coming term. That politician has to be recognized as an advocate of the pro-European option, with a proven ability to implement his goals. He has to be acknowledged as an authority on the international arena. Lech Walesa is such a politician.

[Signed] Jan Krzysztof Bielecki

Tadeusz Mazowiecki

Andrzej Olechowski

Krzysztof Skubiszewski

Hanna Suchocka

Freedom Union Calls For Support for Walesa

LD0611222595 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2200 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Freedom Union [UW] National Council has appealed to its sympathizers to support Lech Walesa in the runoff on 19 November. The council stressed in a statement that Kwasniewski's presidency will jeopardize political changes in Poland. The continuation can only be guaranteed by Lech Walesa.

Olszewski Will Not Support Walesa in 2d Round

LD0611205295 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Jan Olszewski, who came fourth in the first round of the presidential elections, said in a television interview that he did not see any possibility of casting his vote in the second round of the election for either Aleksander Kwasniewski or Lech Walesa.

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[Begin Olszewski recording] Walesa is the worst possible right-wing candidate in the setup we have now. However, this is the situation. Lech Walesa has an enormous negative electorate and, in my opinion, it will be very difficult, if at all possible, to break this negative superiority. [end recording]

Former Presidential Candidate To Remain Apolitical

LD0711103495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0600 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Tadeusz Zielinski, the civil rights ombudsman, will not support either of the candidates in the second round of the presidential elections. He will not even encourage his voters to take part in the next ballot because he believes that participation in the elections is a right and not a duty.

[Begin Zielinski recording] I am apolitical. After a vacation I have returned to the ombudsman's office. Encouraging my voters to cast their votes for one of the two candidates would mean making a political statement in favor of one side. [end recording]

Kwasniewski Wants More Specificity in 2d Round

LD0611195995 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview for Polish Radio, Aleksander Kwasniewski stressed that he wanted a matter-of-fact campaign before the second round of the elections so the voters could learn about specific differences between his and Lech Walesa's programs.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] The five years for which we elect a president is a very specific period, in which there will be matters to resolve, difficult matters. There is a certain political calendar that is important. The voters should know what the candidates think about these issues. After all, in a way the voters sign a contract of employment with this man for a period of five years. So, they would like to have a clear idea whether, for example, there will be a new constitution, whether there will be early parliamentary elections or the elections will be held as scheduled, and so on, and so on. There are many very specific issues, and clear answers provided by the candidates will make the voters' decisions easier. [end recording]

Hopes for Ideological Support

LD0611161095 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The winner of the first round of the presidential elections, Aleksander Kwasniewski, said at a meeting with foreign journalists that in the second round he would be counting on the support of the electorate of Jacek Kuron, Tadeusz Zielinski, and Waldemar Pawlak. Kwasniewski pointed out similarities in his program and the programs of the three other candidates who did not succeed.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] There is no doubt that Mr. Tadeusz Zielinski's program and my program, when it comes to the issues of state, democracy, state-church relations, and social policy, are very close.

There are many similarities between Jacek Kuron's program and my program, certainly with regard to the issues of state-church relations and the constitutional order.

Also I can see common issues in Waldemar Pawlak's program. Apart from everything else, he is the coalition partner who, I am convinced, particularly after yesterday's vote appreciates the coalition more than he did before these elections.

So, I think I shall be able to start a matter-of-fact dialogue with these three candidates or with the electorate of these three candidates. [end recording]

Church Not To Influence Voters in 2d Round

LD0611140995 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1247 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Lublin, 6 Nov—Today, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary general of the Polish Episcopate, told journalists in Lublin that he would not indicate any candidate in the second round of the presidential elections. "We do not want to get directly involved in the elections, and people have their own opinions," Bishop Pieronek said.

"The church's position has already been expressed in two letters—of 26 August and 15 September—and I do not think any amendments are necessary here because indicating parties or names is totally ruled out. This is a very important position because we do not want to get directly involved in the elections and people have their own judgment, and I do not think any suggestions are necessary here," Bishop Pieronek said.

"These are elections in which each of us, as a citizen, is autonomous. This is not a sphere in which obedience to the church is obligatory because we are not dealing with situations where rapacious totalitarianism is creeping in, or capitalism with teeth, which will bite our heads off. More calm, reflection, and long-term thinking. We must show still more circumspection," Bishop Pieronek added.

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Church Behavior on Election Day

WS0611152695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Nov 95 p 5

[Article by "JT," "RAF," "DOM," "WK," and correspondents: "The Church and the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Advice on who to vote for was given where priests have long been known for their strong political convictions.*

Only Walesa

"Catholics! On 5 November we are voting only for Lech Walesa," said a note pinned on the notice board at the Corpus Christi Church of the Lateran Canon Regulars in Krakow.

"I think that for the sake of Poland we should elect Lech Walesa once again," Father Henryk Jankowski appealed to the faithful in St. Brygida's Church in Gdansk at each Mass.

Walesa's campaign posters hung on the church doors. "Let us pray to God that he wins today because something might go wrong in the second round. I have already been to the voting station. A former secretary of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] sat on the commission," he said in his sermons.

Father Jankowski blamed the Mazowiecki government and the "thick line" policy [of cutting away the communist past] for the fact that former PZPR members are sitting on the election committees. "The president did things better or worse, but at least we know who he is. Excuse me for speaking about these things in a sermon," he said. He concluded: "It is the last minute. I can understand how someone can think differently, but you have to think in Polish and about Poland."

Many churches did not call on their parishioners to vote for Walesa, but prayers were said for him. In Rzeszow one of the priests asked children at religion classes to persuade their parents to vote for the incumbent president, otherwise "they would sadden the Holy Father."

Vote Because It Is Your Duty

Priests generally persuaded the faithful to vote. "Go vote immediately after Mass; it is your duty. Do not listen to television, the radio, the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS], the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP], or your priest. Go and use your right of freedom to choose wisely, as your conscience tells you to," said Father Henryk Michalak, the priest at the Parish of the Holy Followers of Father Rafal and Brother Albert in the Warsaw district of Marymont. A week earlier, the priest had declared that he would vote for Jan Olszewski and even made an appearance in that candidate's campaign clip. On voting Sunday, however, he did not mention any name.

At the St. Jan Kanty Church in Krakow, leaflets were distributed with an alarming title: "The Homeland Is in Danger!," followed by a quote from Socrates: "A nation that loses its memory loses its life." Instead of a signature, there was the date of the presidential elections.

The notice board at the Carmelite Church of the Visitation of the Holy Virgin in Krakow carried a note that people should vote because "who stays at home also votes—for a candidate of the camp that defies Christian values."

Churchgoers were reminded in sermons that the episcopate had already warned against voting for the man who was a part of the communist governments. Father Andrzej Luter at St. Alexander's Church in Warsaw said: "We should vote for the candidate advocating the principles of the Gospel."

Generally speaking, however, priests either did not mention the elections or simply said that 5 November is an important day for Poland and reminded what the opening hours of the voting stations were.

During the Sunday Mass broadcast on radio, Bishop Adam Smigielski from Sosnowiec did not even allude to the elections.

On Saturday, at the Jesuit church in Rakowiecka Street in Warsaw, the preacher warned against judging people on the basis of their nationality, and Father Andrzej Galk, the rector of St. Martin's Church in Warsaw, intensely appealed to parishioners on Sunday to respect people of different views.

No electioneering was carried out at the garrison church in Wrzeszcz, headed by Walesa's former chaplain Father Franciszek Cybula. The priest, celebrating Mass at the metropolitan cathedral in Gdansk-Oliwa, said: "You have to make the choice to the best of your Christian judgment and choose whoever is better."

Polling Experts on Voting Preferences in 2d Round

WS0711154995 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by "NIKA": "Some Voters Will Not Heed Their Candidates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A Demoskop poll shows that, before 5 November, less than half of the voters declared their willingness to cast their votes for someone indicated by their candidate. One in three stated they would not do this.*

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No one is expecting the voters to follow the voting instructions of candidates who failed to make it to the second round of elections. "Everything depends on whether the electorate is disciplined," claims Jaroslaw Pawlak from the RUN polling institute. The more disciplined the voters, the higher the probability they will follow the instructions of the candidate they supported in the first round.

Apart from Aleksander Kwasniewski, who will obviously not hand over his votes to anyone else, only Jan Olszewski can boast a loyal electorate. Some of his supporters may vote for Walesa, but the rest would rather stay home. The supporters of Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz may be expected to give their votes to Lech Walesa because of the similarities between both electorates.

It is difficult to say what Waldemar Pawlak's voters will do—some of them definitely identify with Walesa's system of Christian values, others are nostalgic for the times of the Polish People's Republic and are not thrilled with the prospect that Poland will join the EU. This causes them to tend to lean toward Kwasniewski. The second round will also show the depth of the Solidarity roots of the Union of Freedom.

Jaroslaw Pawlak does stress that these are estimates based on polls carried out just a few days before the elections. Everything may change over the two weeks before the second round.

Demoskop polls show that, before the first round of elections, less than half the voters declared their willingness to vote for anyone their candidate indicated. One in three of the respondents would definitely not heed such instructions.

Tomasz Zukowski, from the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP], adds that all predictions from before the first round should be treated with extreme caution because the situation that developed after 5 November will define the Polish political scene anew.

Prime Minister's Wife Sues Daily Over 'Red Web'

WS0711092495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by Andrzej Witul, Piotr Wysocki, and "GT": "The Web. Mrs. Oleksy Works for Polisa; Super Consultant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The prime minister's wife, Maria Oleksy, is employed as a consultant at Polisa SA, the insurance company in which government agencies hold stakes. The vice president of Polisa confirmed this in a conversation with ZYCIE WARSZAWY. The prime minister reported yesterday that his wife has filed a case in court against our newspaper.*

ZYCIE WARSZAWY asked Zygfryd Kielarski, vice president of the Polisa Insurance and Mutual Insurance Association SA, whether Maria Oleksy or Jolanta Kwasniewska were employed by the company. The vice president admitted that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy's wife is employed as a consultant.

The prime minister announced in Gdynia yesterday that his wife has sued ZYCIE WARSZAWY for libel. Oleksy said our reports on the "red web" were a manifestation of ill will.

A special report on the purchase of Polisa shares by the State Fund for the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped (an agency of the Ministry of Labor) is to land on [Labor] Minister Leszek Miller's desk. [passage omitted]

Oleksy: Future of Coalition To Be Discussed

LD0611211595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1957 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 6 Nov—Asked by journalists today whether low support for the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] presidential candidate will have an impact on the functioning of the PSL-SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] coalition, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy replied that a meeting of the coalition will be held tomorrow and "nobody is going to avoid the issue."

Earlier, the prime minister had expressed the conviction that the second round of the presidential election could be the round of a "good-tempered and businesslike" conversation between the two candidates. He expressed the hope that it will be free from fight and agitation "especially at the low level."

Oleksy stressed that the government will work as usual. "The final result of the election is not going to prompt a change of government, so this government can act in a longer perspective," he added.

The prime minister is aware that there may again be "references to the government," although with only two candidates they should have a lot to focus their attention on. Lech Walesa demonstrated that he could conduct the campaign without aggression and let it remain like that in the second round, Oleksy added.

Rightists Renew Attempts at Forming Single Bloc

WS0711115995 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by "WZ": "ZChN and KK Leaders on Integration; A Broad Rightist Camp"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Will the right return to the concept of the Alliance for Poland?*

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Ryszard Czarnecki, chairman of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], and Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski, chairman of the Conservative Coalition [KK], told us yesterday that they will persuade rightist groupings to make a new attempt at creating a broad political camp.

All previous efforts were unsuccessful. The differences between platforms were too huge. Subsequent coalitions broke up because of differences of opinions on presidential candidates, chiefly Lech Walesa.

"In the first round of elections, a huge majority of the rightist constituency voted for Walesa. It is time to draw conclusions from that," said Ujazdowski, until recently a staunch opponent of the president. Ujazdowski maintains that the rightist camp could include factions that supported Walesa, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, and Jan Olszewski in the first round of elections.

ZChN Chairman Ryszard Czarnecki is skeptical about the participation of politicians as "anti-Walesa" as Jan Olszewski, [Solidarity activist] Zygmunt Wrzodak, and [Chairman of the Center Accord—PC] Jaroslaw Kaczynski in the coalition. He claims: "We need a moderate right that would be autonomous from Lech Walesa, yet capable of cooperating with him." Ujazdowski states likewise.

Meanwhile, Kaczynski told us yesterday that he is backing out of politics. He does not see a niche for himself because significant rightist centers may form only around Walesa and Olszewski. From other sources we have learned that the majority of PC members are inclined to support the former prime minister. Others, however, would prefer close-knit cooperation with the KK.

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Interior Minister on Immigration Talks in India

AU0711102695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 4 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila returned home this morning from a visit to India at the invitation of his Indian counterpart C.V. Chavan. On his arrival at Otopeni Airport, the minister gave us the following statement:

[Begin recording] The main goal of the visit was the signing of the accord on the return of citizens who have illegally entered the other state. Aside from talks at the Ministry of Interior, which mainly dealt with this point, I also had talks on the implementation of the 1994 accord on combating terrorism and organized crime, particularly illicit drugs trafficking. We also discussed problems of exchanges between our ministries, mainly in the sphere of information and data, but also operational exchanges along police work lines.

Aside from these talks at the Ministry of Interior, I had several meetings with political leaders. In this respect, I would mention the talks I had with His Excellency Mr. (Vadir), chairman of the Lower Chamber, and with the deputy speaker of the Senate, who had been my hosts two years ago, when I headed a parliamentary delegation to India. Our hosts expressed great interest in the changes that have occurred in Romania in the last few years, mainly in the political field. However, the Indian officials particularly inquired about the progress of reform and privatization in our country. As a matter of fact, various businessmen also participated in our last meeting with these public figures. The talks mainly dealt with economic problems and they showed interest in the privatization process in Romania and in various ways and means for making concrete investment in our country.

In conclusion, I would say that this visit produced good results and the clauses of the accord concluded there, which was conceived in European terms, I would say, although it has been concluded with an Asian country, provide both for the observation of human rights, that is for the freedom to movement of all citizens as well as their obligation totally to observe our country's laws and international legal norms.

I cannot say that Romania is currently faced with any special or serious situation regarding Indian citizens illegally on our country's territory, estimated to number around 800. Nevertheless, the illegal presence of any citizen on another state's territory is an infringement of the law. Therefore, the relevant ministry must concern itself with the situation since these people are potential lawbreakers.

I would like to say that our concerns were met with particular understanding by the Indian Government, which agreed to this agreement with us, thanks to the traditionally very good relations between the Romanian and Indian peoples and governments. [end recording]

Commentary Views Reasons for PRM-PDSR Split

AU0211143895 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 23 Oct 95 p 1

[Commentary by Ion Cristoiu: "It Was Not the PDSR but Rather the PRM That Broke the Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of last week, the press was preoccupied with passionately reflecting and commenting on the PDSR's [Social Democracy Party of Romania] decision to break the political alliance with the PRM [Greater Romania Party]. EVENIMENTUL ZILEI readers might have noticed, perhaps, that I was not among the analysts who hastened to publicize what had happened right on the following day. I did not do so not because I was engaged in publishing a series of commentaries on the issue of diplomacy by means of the Army (after all I could have interrupted that series to consecrate an article to the resounding divorce) but rather because no lucid examination of all its implications could have been done on the spot and, especially, not before one heard its echoes in the press and Romanian political life. Having heard those echoes, I realized that it was no mistake to allow some time to elapse before I tried to draw some conclusions regarding the PDSR-PRM split. What can one find after having scrutinized the reactions of journalists and politicians? An enormous error in the assessments. Starting with the headlines and ending with the contents of the comments, they all consider the PDSR-PRM divorce a devastating blow to the party led by Corneliu Vadim Tudor [PRM]. If I may indulge in a comparison, I would say that the journalists and politicians interpreted this moment as similar to the breakup of friendship between an elephant and a little mouse. It is easy to understand that in such a case one presumes that, after the elephant's announcement, the mouse must go through the following emotional states: deadly fear, making its entire body tremble, and utter stupefaction, as if it were facing a totally unexpected situation. Under such circumstances, it is also normal, as everybody would expect, that, seeing itself deprived of their friendship, the mouse should start imploring its huge companion to make up again, knowing that otherwise the cat would get it. Well, the events that followed the PDSR leadership decision totally contradict this idea. The PRM did not rush to the door of the PDSR begging for reconciliation. Taking many people by surprise, Corneliu Vadim Tudor

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launched a vigorous counterattack during his news conference. What is more, proving that he is not the little mouse many thought him to be, he withdrew his party's representatives from the power bodies, following which, on Saturday [21 October], he attended, together with the PD [Democratic Party], the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], and the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], all of which used to be his enemies, a meeting with the student leaders, a meeting intended to find ways to alter the Education Law. This response to the PDSR decision by the PRM proves that I am right to say that, actually, it was not the PDSR that split with the PRM, but rather the PRM that divorced the governing party. Let me explain. I was the sole analyst, perhaps, who, at the very beginning of the war between Corneliu Vadim Tudor and Ion Iliescu, drew attention to the fact that this was not due to an uncontrolled outburst of the PRM leader reacting to an assertion made by the head of the Romanian state while in the United States [saying that Tudor is Romania's Zhirinovskiy], but we were rather witnessing the beginning of a well-pondered electoral campaign. Had this not been the case, the subsequent events would have certainly followed a different scenario. Corneliu Vadim Tudor would not have found it so difficult to forgive Iliescu for the metaphor he had used, especially considering the fact that, when he returned home, the president backtracked, stating that the press had distorted what he really said. Considering that the press, part of which the PRM leaders likes to call "the foul press," had been the target of many of his attacks and slander campaigns, it would not have been all too difficult for him to charge against the journalists again, claiming that they had tried to trick him into splitting with Ion Iliescu. However, the PRM president did nothing of the kind. Despite the fact that President Iliescu reversed his stance and the PDSR leaders also tried, for a while, to hide their heads in the sand, Corneliu Vadim Tudor still continued to attack. As I have already pointed out in one of my earlier editorials, the articles published in his papers ROMANIA MARE and POLITICA were not limited just to his by now customary bad jokes. They outlined the main principles of a soundly elaborated electoral platform. Using his polemic with Ion Iliescu and the PDSR as a pretext, the PRM actually tried to make public opinion bear in mind the fundamental elements of its political platform, as all parties do when they set out on the road to conquer power.

It is true, there were moments during the conflict when the PRM leader acted as if he would be ready to make amends. He claimed, for instance, that the entire scandal was artificial and that he was not the author of the swear words directed at President Iliescu. However, this was nothing but a devious tactical move. In order to achieve its fundamental goal—namely to make its electoral platform known among the citizens—the PRM needed to make its alliance with the PDSR last a little longer. During that time, playing the comedy of minor concessions, Corneliu Vadim Tudor would have kept on indoctrinating public opinion with his electoral messages. This would have paid off because being a member of the ruling coalition would have made it possible to enhance even more the double-dealing game he has been playing over the past months, namely to profit from the advantages offered by the alliance with the PDSR and to use those advantages to attack the majority party and Ion Iliescu, that is, to engage in one's own electoral campaign with the help of the PDSR and the president of the country.

The PDSR's recent decision to split from the PRM, which stirred so many comments, was not taken—as very many people mistakenly assume—because the PDSR wanted to improve its internal and international image by getting rid of its extremist ally but rather because they had grasped the PRM tactics. From this point of view, the PDSR decision came catastrophically late. Minimizing Corneliu Vadim Tudor's strength and especially being unable to see the forces behind him, the ruling party blundered incredibly. The PDSR leaders and perhaps Ion Iliescu himself, too, continued to consider Corneliu Vadim Tudor as a mere toy that could be easily turned off just by frowning at it. To their stupefaction, they now found that the toy would not let itself be switched off and goes on operating. What was the mistake made by PDSR leaders and Iliescu? It is true, Corneliu Vadim Tudor is a toy that they created themselves. Precisely in the same way as Corneliu Vadim Tudor, as a journalist, was a toy created by Petre Roman [reference to the fact that despite warnings, then Prime Minister Roman allowed Tudor to publish the PRM official weekly ROMANIA MARE]. However, Petre Roman's unhappy fate proves that this toy could rapidly switch sides and run over to one's adversaries. After Ion Iliescu's divorce from Petre Roman, the journalist Vadim abandoned the former prime minister and joined Iliescu. And he became a terrible instrument of the president in his war against Petre Roman. However, something similar is now happening to Ion Iliescu. The toy called the politician Corneliu Vadim Tudor has switched sides and joined the forces that oppose the current president. This is as dangerous for Iliescu as it was for the toy's first owner, Petre Roman. All this accounts for the fact that Corneliu Vadim Tudor would not retreat despite all the efforts made by the PDSR, as well as Ion Iliescu, to ease the conflict. This accounts for the surprisingly firm stance of the PRM in the way it reacted to the PDSR decision. The mouse is no longer a mouse or at least it does not consider

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itself one. Contrary to all expectations, the PDSR's decision does not mean that the battle is over. It will continue, and it will be a life-and-death struggle. Even if, originally, Corneliu Vadim Tudor planned to double-cross the ruling party by maintaining the alliance with it, he also made preparations in case they split. And the PDSR headed by Ion Iliescu will lose the war if they continue to minimize the strength of the forces behind Corneliu Vadim Tudor.

PRM Attacks on SRI Seen as Part of Coup Aim

AU0711111995 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Petre Mihai Bacanu: "Inciting Rebellion in the Army, ROMANIA MARE Also Attacks the Structures of the Romanian Intelligence Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The prospect of the victory for the communists in the elections in Russia next December seems to have placed their Romanian counterparts under real time pressure in their strong-arm endeavor to take over the power levers in Romania even before the elections. The "Letter of the 300 Officers" [last June], which was a historical falsehood, inaugurated this process; its aim was to provoke a rebellion within the Army, to compromise and annihilate its prestige, and the create a situation of chaos propitious for a coup. The latest issue of ROMANIA MARE (weekly of the Greater Romania Party-PRM led by Corneliu Vadim Tudor) contains the proof, as it was only to be expected, of the fact that the coup is the main goal of the extremists. The proof is the attack launched against the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] as Romania's state security structure. After the rebellion in the Army, which should have taken place against the background of the current absolutely necessary restructuring and modernization of the Army, it was only logical that incitement to rebellion in the SRI should follow, also through a "letter," signed globally, bravely, and pompously by a group of SRI high-ranking officers (?). These "kolkhozes" of "officers," who refuse to put their signatures in writing, could not possibly shun the SRI for a very simple reason. For the coup in Romania to succeed, the main intelligence service had to be annihilated or possibly placed in the service of the plotters' goals.

The "Letter" published on page 16 of ROMANIA MARE of 20 October 1995 is quite telling in this respect. But first of all, I would like to make an observation. Although it should have appeared on Friday, 20 October, the latest issue of ROMANIA MARE came out ahead of time on Monday, 16 October! Moreover, it was printed with double the usual number of pages without a change in its sale price.

So important was the anti-SRI letter that ROMANIA MARE came out overnight, at double its usual number of pages (at a time of a full paper crisis), and was offered on all street corners at half its real price. These are not mere coincidences but are rather indicative of the urgency and importance attached to attacking the intelligence structures of the Romanian state, represented (for the time being) by the SRI in the eyes of the architects of the strong-arm process inaugurated by the "Letter of the 300." It also proves that this strong-arm process cannot be reduced to simple "humorist" polemics and that things can become irreversible if they are not dealt with appropriately.

Conceived as a long number of provoking questions, the "Anti-SRI Letter" published by ROMANIA MARE mainly aims at destroying the SRI's undercover structures—that is the base of the intelligence operations of all such services—through public exposure. Therefore, point No. 6 of the "letter" includes six other auxiliary questions such as:

1. What guarantees "are being offered to us" (this exact formulation is worthy of mention) that the undercover SRI officers are working for the national security? (The "guarantees" required would implicitly mean uncovering the undercover structures, that is the SRI's annihilation)

2. How many of the undercover officers are the SRI director's friends? (Obviously a pretext to begin the disclosure of certain names in the next issue of ROMANIA MARE, thus compromising those people, in the name of good intentions of course, not of the plotters' hidden goals.)

3. What are the tasks of this category of officers? (That is the list of their missions, so that they may not include targeting the plotters themselves!)

4. How many of them received "financial benefits"? (That is, a little financial checking, on which occasion Corneliu Vadim Tudor may "lay hold," as he himself says, on some secret materials—after all, he is vice president of the Senate and a man with the country's interests at heart—which he can reuse in the ROMANIA MARE)

5. How many of the undercover officers were recruited from certain political parties? (It can do no harm to involve the "parties" a little, too, and "draw them" on his side against the SRI, so that later he can state in the Senate that everything was but a concoction of the "ghosts from the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party-PNTCD and Civic Alliance Party-PAC," instigated from abroad, in keeping with the well-known diversionist pattern, while Corneliu Vadim Tudor would obviously disclaim any part in it at all!)

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6. What has happened with and where is the former secretary of the SRI director, from 1990? (So that he may be "compelled" to make certain important disclosures!)

A very interesting observation contained in the letter refers to the Gypsies where the question is rhetorically asked: "Who is interested in this ostrich policy, when matters are openly broached in all European countries with more or less similar problems?" The hint to the methods of ethnic purification is obvious. Once the contentious issue of the Gypsies is "opened," who would still bear responsibility for what will happen in the country? That would be a good occasion for ethnic diversion with catastrophic consequences for Romania in the international mass media.

Therefore, that is why one should not conduct an "ostrich policy"! It prevents the launching of an ethnic purification drive, which is the surest way to further isolate Romania internationally. Who stands to benefit from Romania's isolation? Only those interested in a restoration so that they can impose a "strong-arm regime" (which would be anti-Western and anti-NATO) for at least "a few years," as the political program of a certain party stipulates. You may easily guess what the consequences of such a thing would be since you have experienced them not for a few years but for some 45 years!

Therefore, the "Anti-SRI Letter" is in conformity with the logic of the strong-arm process inaugurated by the "Letter of the 300 Officers." After the Army, now the SRI's turn has come. Who is next?

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Commentary Says Clinton 'Overlooking' Kucan

AU0611155695 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 2 Nov 95 p 25

[Commentary by Danilo Slivnik: "Stigmatization in New York"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The question is not why U.S. President Bill Clinton received Slovene Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek in the UN palace last week, but why he did not receive Milan Kucan. Namely, both men were there, to hand, in the same corridor so to speak, however, Clinton only met with one of them, overlooking the other. Furthermore, for precisely this meeting Drnovsek had to leave for New York in haste, as he had already had the official address in the United Nations two weeks earlier, while the other man (Milan Kucan) was in New York in accordance with an earlier schedule, and so the difference was more than evident. The U.S. Administration literally made the effort to prove that, given a choice of the Slovene partners, it will definitely not pick the former No. 1 communist, Milan Kucan, who is a sort of a symbol of the party continuity, but (a slightly younger) communist, Dr. Janez Drnovsek, who, by virtue of his political pedigree, although not an entirely "new man," is at least from the younger generation.

The choice has far-reaching consequences because nothing in the U.S. diplomacy (and administration) happens by coincidence. This means that Washington considered thoroughly what to do with the current Slovene leadership, that is, whom to receive at the highest level, and ultimately decided for Drnovsek while "crossing out" Kucan out from all their lists, who thus became a sort of second-class statesman. It is, therefore, no wonder that he returned from New York all green in the face and that not even his most faithful commentators and reporters, who have strived hard to make it appear in the media that it was Kucan, and not Prime Minister Drnovsek, who was the main man in New York, could not help much. Of course, one cannot avoid the question of why the Americans made this "differentiation." For a long time, it seemed that they were oblivious to whatever was happening in Slovenia and who was directing (and supervising) the transition, but then they suddenly changed their mind. The first to indicate that Bill Clinton might receive Dr. Janez Drnovsek soon was U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry during his visit to Slovenia. He unexpectedly turned to Drnovsek and said: "Well, you will discuss all this with our President...." Some of the people around Drnovsek were so surprised that they thought they had misheard him, as the U.S. diplomatic representatives had shortly before that claimed that Clinton "did not have a free slot" in the coming year.

However, somebody in the U.S. administration evidently decided to intervene and draw a clear line between the "entirely unacceptable" and "somewhat more acceptable" Slovene politicians on the diplomatic scene and, thus, put an end to the speculations as to who had international legitimacy (at least until the coming parliamentary elections) and who did not. Milan Kucan was stripped of his legitimacy before the eyes of the entire world, so to speak, while legitimacy was conditionally granted to Drnovsek with a clear remark that he ought to be very careful about the further course of the transition. The transition has long been a stumbling block for the Americans, who did not fail to notice the domination of the forces of the old political continuity over the past few years as well as the fact that "the successful transition" also contained numerous traps, although the Slovene ambassador to Washington, Dr. Ernest Petric, was in the habit of whispering to the officials there "that the only one who counts in Slovenia is Milan Kucan" and that Clinton should, therefore, receive him and not somebody else. The White House obviously made its own decision and, thus, confirmed that it was well acquainted with the political circumstances in our country, although it appeared not to have the slightest clue in the initial period after 1990. Those were the times when they were under the influence of the mistakes by Belgrade-based Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, who sent completely wrong analyses to Washington for three years and is definitely one of the biggest culprits for the serious escalation of the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This is usually the case when ambassadors are incompetent.

Clinton's choice dealt a heavy blow to Milan Kucan because now there is no longer any doubt that the rumors that the doors to our president of the state were closed in many places abroad were not exaggerated and that his "velvet transition" was primarily an achievement for the postcommunists and not the democrats. Namely, Kucan's champions have staunchly denied this all the time, maintaining that he was supposedly "a welcome interlocutor everywhere," that his, "a true international charmer" in the best meaning of the former "proletarian internationalism." And then the thing with Clinton ensued. The shock was so bad that it astounded even his closest aides, who started telling around that Kucan and Drnovsek had actually agreed who would meet with Clinton and that the first man gave priority to the latter because this would allegedly help him in the elections. There is a possibility, of course, that the White House picked Drnovsek for pragmatic financial reasons because it is known that the prime minister

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advocates repayment of all Slovene debts, including some Yugoslav ones—and the Americans like to have accounts sorted.

However, Milan Kucan will probably continue to be active on the international sphere in the future. For instance, he will visit Austrian Carinthia next month. As, it is rumored, not for an official visit, but to do his Christmas shopping.

Impact of Citizenship Issue on Credibility Viewed

AU0711104395 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 28 Oct 95 p 1

[Commentary by Slava Partlic: "Squandering Credibility"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the international professional public, humanitarian organizations, and human rights organizations, all that one considers to be part of civilized society, Slovenia enjoyed great sympathy and support in the period of its disconnecting from the hapless Balkan train and establishing its own state. It was so also because or even especially because there was understanding for the distress of the people from the other parts of the Yugoslav state of that time who found themselves under Slovenia's roof in these tempestuous times. It was so also because or even especially because of the ill-famed Article 40, which was in fact the essence of the solemn promise Slovenia made then to the effect that it will consider as its own all those people who feel at home in Slovenia.

After Slovenia became a sovereign, independent, and internationally recognized state, some people ascertained that there are simply too many of these people who feel at home in our country. A repeal of a promise between partners in everyday life is certainly not moral, even if possible—particularly when made by the stronger partner.

No doubt that by withdrawing citizenship from all those people who acquired it according to Article 40, Slovenia will really step out of the circle of democratic and civilized states, something that could be heard in the parliament yesterday. And although there is in fact no fear that something like that may happen, because, thank heavens, the basic principles of the rule of law still apply, it nevertheless seems that, with these attempts at "ethnic cleansing" by legal means that have taken place repeatedly for several years already, Slovenia has already lost much of its former credibility. In that sense it is in fact pleasing that even the proposers of the referendum on withdrawing citizenship from the people who attained it through Article 40 yesterday supported the proposal that the constitutional court should decide on the constitutionality of such ideas. For here, one can at least see some receptivity for the basics of legal culture.

Referendum on Krsko Nuclear Plant Proposed

AU0211170495 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 27 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by Matjaz Albreht: "Closure of Nuclear Power Station To Be Decided at Referendum"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 26 Oct—A group of 37 parliamentary deputies from all the deputy groups (except for the Christian Democrats) have signed a demand for a preliminary legislative referendum on the closure and decommissioning of the Krsko nuclear power station within 10 years at the latest. If a majority vote to close it down, deputies would have to pass the law that has in fact already been going through parliament. The group is suggesting that the State Chamber chairman organize the referendum for 24 December.

At a news conference, Dr. Leo Seserko said that Slovenia would restrict the use of nuclear power to the field of medicine alone. [passage omitted]

The decision to close down the nuclear power station is the exclusive right of the citizens of Slovenia, Seserko pointed out, even though half of the cost of building it was borne by Croatia. Slovenia is sovereign on its own territory and, therefore, one should not have to ask its neighbors about that. In any case, Seserko said, many Croatian citizens oppose the nuclear power station as well.

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Federal

Dayton Talks Said To Be 'Progressing Slowly'

LD0611205595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2026 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Smederevo, Serbia, Nov. 6 (TANJUG)—All eyes are fixed on Dayton, from where we expect a peace agreement, said a member of the innermost leadership of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia at a meeting in Smederevo, a town 40 km east of Belgrade.

Radmilo Bogdanovic, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Yugoslav Parliament, said the summit was progressing slowly because the Muslim side was coming out with new demands constantly.

The status of the Srem-Baranja region in Krajina, on which depended the future of its 200,000 inhabitants, would also be discussed, said Bogdanovic.

The Srem-Baranja region is the eastern part of the republic of Serb Krajina, whose western, southern and northern parts were occupied by Croatia in May and August this year.

National Bank Agrees to Market Exchange Rate

AU0711104495 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] National Bank Governor Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic stated in Milocer that at a session of the bank's board of governors the board had embraced a program that envisages a transition to the market exchange rate and elimination of trade restrictions, namely, import and export permits.

Increased exports will facilitate greater imports, greater imports will lead to greater production which will result in greater earnings, greater budget income, and greater employment, Governor Avramovic said.

Serbia

Vranje Authorities Want Own TV Studio

AU0611215395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Nov 95 p 9

[Article by V. Ristic: "Disturbances in Political Relations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At one of its recent sessions, the Executive Council of the Vranje Municipality decided to expand the operations of Vranje Radio and broadcast its own television programs. The participants in the debate at the session said that the municipality needed to raise an additional 50,000 German marks to broadcast local television programs. It was decided to demand from Dragan Stojanovic, the current head of the RTS [Radio and Television of Serbia] studio in Vranje, which has been in charge of staffing and the technical realization of local television programs, information and evidence of how 150,000 dinars provided by local businesses for the development of the local television have been spent. According to the local government's decision, Stojanovic will also have to inform them on how much of the funds set aside by the Vranje Municipality has been spent. It was also decided to authorize Sinisa Mitic, the newly appointed acting director of Radio and Television of Vranje, to take over these funds from the Service for Financial Transactions.

In this way, the Vranje authorities have completed the job of setting up a local radio and television station. This issue had been the subject of long political, but not journalistic, disputes in this town at the foot of Mt. Pljackovica. A stop has finally been put to the original idea according to which the RTS office headed by Dragan Stojadinovic would be in charge of developing local television for which the Vranje businesses have been paying considerable amounts of money, whose value has been eaten up by inflation in the maze of indecisiveness and political quarrels about staffing.

The programs of the local television in Vranje started on 7 September with a relay from the festive session of the municipal assembly. The RTS studio in Vranje carried daily news programs and a weekly summary of the most important events in Vranje and the neighboring municipalities. And then, Sinisa Mitic, director of Vranje Radio, was appointed head of local television. The programs stopped and discussions ensued on how to bypass the RTS studio, which has technical capability and staff to work on the realization of the local programs, and to set up as soon as possible own studio for Radio and Television of Vranje.

In the meantime, changes in RTS programming resulted in the Vranje studio being given the task of preparing once a week (on Thursdays) a 30-minute program about events in the Pcinja region that would be watched in a good part of Serbia. Broadcasting of a special program covering Pcinja region will also begin very soon from a floor below, from the premises of Vranje Radio.

Kosovo

Rugova Predicts Independence for Kosovo

LD0211172095 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 1130 GMT 2 Nov 95

[Passages contained within quotation marks are recorded in vernacular, fading into Swedish translation]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the peace talks on Bosnia, taking place in the United States, one region is at

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risk of being ignored, and that is Kosovo, where the antagonisms between the Serbian regime and the Albanian majority are very great. It has long been thought that these antagonisms may trigger a new war in the Balkans. This is what Ibrahim Rugova, the political leader of the Kosovo Albanians, speaking in his office in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, says about the risk of Kosovo being left out of a peace settlement.

[Rugova] "I have worked toward avoiding that risk, and Kosovo will doubtless be included in a global settlement of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia."

Rugova admits, however, that Kosovo, or Kosova as the Albanians call it, will not, at least initially, play any particularly prominent role in the attempts to bring about a settlement. Right now, the most important thing is to bring about an end to the war in Bosnia, he says. [passage omitted]

While the confrontation between the two poles of power in Kosovo has been exacerbated, the Albanian leaders have become increasingly radical in their demands. It is no longer a matter of demanding self-rule; the struggle is now only about an independent state, totally separated from Serbia, a state which, according to Ibrahim Rugova, already exists.

[Rugova] "The Republic of Kosovo already exists in practice. The legal basis for that exists, and so do all state institutions. We have our own schools, our own health care, our own sports and cultural organizations, and so on. Everything is well organized, although, of course, under conditions of constant persecution by the Serbian authorities."

Since the Serbs cannot accept an independent Kosovo—the Serbs view Kosovo as their own national cradle—Rugova proposes that Kosovo should be placed under international control for a period, but only as an interim solution. Defiantly, and against all political odds, Ibrahim Rugova says he is convinced that there will be an independent Kosovo before the end of the century. [passage omitted]

Serb Settlers Receive Jobs, Facilities

AU0611102595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English Nos 738 and 739 on 1 and 2 November carry several reports on the "settlement" of Serbian refugees in various areas in the province.

Under the headline "Over 30 Serb Colonists Given Jobs at a Vushtrri [Vucitrn] Firm," Report No 738 says that "in a bid to secure permanent settlement to Serb arrivals from Croatia and Bosnia, the Serbian regime has been providing them with apartments and jobs in the state-owned firms in Kosova." Sources in Vucitrn report that "only last week, 19 Serb colonists were given jobs with the Llamkos firm in the town, while 11 others were employed about two weeks ago." The report concludes, noting that "the Serbian-installed management of the firm has been employing Serb colonists regardless of their vocation."

KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 739 on 2 November carries two other reports on Serbian efforts to provide facilities for the new settlers. Headlined "Serb Settlers Housed in Premises of Humanitarian Associations in Prishtina," the first report reads: "The Serbian regime is adamant to see Serb colonists housed in virtually all institutions and buildings in Kosova, including schools, kindergartens, and even prison premises. A so-called crisis team for catering the Serb refugees from Croatia has recently decided that the premises of several humanitarian associations in Prishtina serve for the housing of Serb colonists. Over the past couple of days, some humanitarian associations located at the Miladin Popovic street in the Kosova's capital, Prishtina, have been ordered to vacate the buildings in order to make room for Serb colonists. The Serbian authorities have recently vacated the premises of the association of Blind Persons in Prishtina and Serb arrivals have been reportedly already housed in. Mr. Enver Berisha, chairman of the Kosova Association of Blinds told the Kosova Information Center the entire documentation and assets, estimated to some DM [German marks] 15,000, have been removed from the buildings and sent to unknown destinations. Mr. Berisha also said that only recently, the Serbian-installed authorities in Peje [Pec] have likewise occupied the buildings of the school for blind and deaf persons in the town and Serb arrivals from Croatia have been housed instead."

Another report on 2 November also says that "around 60 Serb arrivals from Croatia have been recently given jobs with the plants of the Feronikeli Mining and Industrial Company in Gllogovc [Glogovac]." Sources in Glogovac quote the Serbian-installed management as "having pledged to provide jobs to all the Serbs housed in socially-owned premises and Feronikeli hostels in the town." The Democratic League of Kosova Information Office in Glogovac notes that "in addition, all the Serb arrivals housed in Gllogovc have been provided all-day meals in the restaurants of the Feronikeli company."

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